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Attacking Tax Shelters: Galloping Toward a Better 
Step Transaction Doctrine 
Jonathan D. Grossberg* 
Since the beginning of the Internal Revenue Code, taxpayers have 
sought to lower their tax bills through creative tax planning. The step 
transaction doctrine is one of several tools used by the Internal Revenue 
Service and courts to challenge tax shelters and tax evasion. The step 
transaction doctrine provides that the courts may combine two or more 
allegedly separate steps in a multi-step transaction into a single step to 
better reflect the economic reality of the taxpayer’s actions. Derived from 
Supreme Court decisions in the 1930s, the doctrine deserves renewed 
scrutiny today because serious conceptual issues exist regarding the three 
current tests that courts use to determine when to combine various steps in 
a tax-motivated multiple-step transaction. This Article addresses two 
perennial themes in tax law: the role of judicial doctrines in a statutory system 
and the difficulty of taxing related-party transactions. This Article argues that 
courts should reformulate the binding commitment, interdependence, and end 
result tests as two objective tests: an objective test based on the law of offer and 
acceptance for arms-length transactions and an economic reality test for 
transactions between related parties. These new tests provide conceptual 
clarity and promote predictability while protecting the public treasury. The 
new tests borrow underlying concepts from contract and commercial law. 
The new tests demonstrate the fruitful possibilities of borrowing across 
areas of law. They also demonstrate that tax law shares similar concerns 
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with other areas of law—a proposition that is sometimes doubted. This 
Article further contends that the step transaction doctrine, as reformulated, 
should be available for assertion by taxpayers in transactions between 
unrelated parties. Acknowledging the availability of the test for assertion 
by taxpayers will have the salutary effect of aligning the letter of the 
doctrine with its application. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Internal Revenue Code (“IRC” or “Code”) and the Treasury 
Regulations (“Regulations”) consume volumes and volumes of provisions. 
These provisions are worded carefully and often reflect competing policies 




beyond raising revenue, such as favoring or disfavoring certain taxpayer 
behavior and advancing social policies. Since the beginning of the Code, 
taxpayers have sought to lower their tax bills through creative tax planning. 
This behavior often has been met with judicial approval.1 Congress, by 
enacting the anti-abuse provisions of the Code, and the Internal Revenue 
Service (“IRS”), by promulgating anti-abuse regulations, have sought to 
combat this behavior.2  
This Article addresses two of the perennial themes of tax law: the role of 
judicial doctrines in a statutory system and the difficulty of taxing transactions 
between related parties. These concerns link this Article to broader themes in 
the law.  
Tax law is governed primarily by code and regulation, as are intellectual 
property law, immigration law, criminal law, and many other areas of law. 
In each of these primarily statutory systems of law, when the courts perceive 
a gap or deficiency in the statutory system, they augment the system with 
judge-made common law.3 
                                                                                                             
 1. See infra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. 
 2. In one recent case, the court noted that 
much of the caselaw using the economic substance, sham transaction, 
and other judicial doctrines in interpreting and applying tax statutes, 
represents an effort to reconcile two competing policy goals. On one 
hand, having clear, concrete rules embodied in a written Code and 
regulations that exclusively define a taxpayer’s obligations (1) facilitates 
smooth operation of our voluntary compliance system, (2) helps to 
render that system transparent and administrable, and (3) furthers the free 
market economy by permitting taxpayers to know in advance the tax 
consequences of their transactions. On the other side of the scales, the 
Code’s and the regulations’ fiendish complexity necessarily creates 
space for attempts to achieve tax results that Congress and the Treasury 
plainly never contemplated, while nevertheless complying strictly with 
the letter of the rules, at the expense of the fisc (and other taxpayers). 
CNT Inv’rs, L.L.C. v. Comm’r, 144 T.C. 161, 198 (2015). 
 3. See generally Brett Fischman & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common 
Law Doctrine of Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and its Application to 
Software, 15 BERK. TECH. L.J. 865 (2000) (discussing the emerging common law 
doctrine of misuse in copyright law as a judicial attempt to prevent statutory 
protection from being abused as an anticompetitive tactic); Alan Scott Rau, 
Intellectual Property, 16 TEX. TECH L. REV. 355 (1985) (discussing how and to 
what extent the Fifth Circuit incorporated the common law doctrine of 
functionality into its reading of the Lanham Act in Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. 
Cox, 732 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1984)); Kiran H. Griffith, Comment, Fugitives in 
Immigration: A Call for Legislative Guidelines on Disentitlement, 36 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 209 (2012) (discussing the use of the common law doctrine of fugitive 
disentitlement in immigration law); John M. Mulcahey, Recent Decision, Res 




In tax law, courts have created doctrines to prevent perceived taxpayer 
abuse. In certain circumstances, some of these doctrines have been 
available to taxpayers to characterize their own transactions in a more tax-
favorable manner.4 These doctrines include substance over form, economic 
substance, business purpose, sham transaction, and step transaction.5 
The courts and Congress have struggled with related-party transactions6 
since the earliest days of the Internal Revenue Code. The assignment of 
income doctrine, as embodied in the classic case of Lucas v. Earl,7 was an 
early effort to address this issue. Specific Code sections, such as §§ 267 and 
1239, also address the issues caused by related-party transactions. The 
Treasury often issues regulations specifically addressing the special 
difficulties of taxing related-party transactions in a variety of contexts.8 
Among these various efforts, the judicial doctrines mentioned above—
substance over form, economic substance, business purpose, sham 
transaction, and step transaction—all of which have their genesis in Gregory 
v. Helvering,9 have played a prominent role in regulating transactions 
between related parties. 
Although scholars recently have paid significant attention to the 
economic substance doctrine, owing in part to its codification, substantially 
less scholarly attention has been paid in recent years to the step transaction 
doctrine.10 This Article contends that the step transaction doctrine is 
undertheorized given its long history and continuing importance in tax 
jurisprudence. In recent years, courts have applied the step transaction 
doctrine in varied cases, such as those regarding distressed asset or debt 
                                                                                                             
Judicata – Criminal Law – Double Jeopardy – DUI, 31 DUQ. L. REV. 625 (1993) 
(discussing the use of the common law doctrine of res judicata in the criminal 
law, especially as by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court).  
 4. This Article refers to a taxpayer’s use of these doctrines to recast the form 
of its own transactions to achieve more favorable tax consequences as an 
“offensive” use of such doctrines. 
 5. For a discussion of these doctrines, see 1 BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE 
LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS ¶ 4.3 (3d ed. 2000). 
 6. See discussion infra Part I.B.3. on transactions between related parties and 
the example of such a transaction in True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165 (1999). 
 7. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930). 
 8. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.385-1 (as amended 2017). 
 9. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). 
 10. For articles discussing the codification of the economic substance doctrine, 
see generally Karen C. Burke, Reframing Economic Substance, 31 VA. TAX REV. 
271 (2011); Leigh Osofsky, The Case Against Strategic Tax Law Uncertainty, 64 
TAX L. REV. 489 (2011); Bret Wells, Economic Substance Doctrine: How 
Codification Changes Decided Cases, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 411 (2010). 




shelters,11 the 501(c)(3) exemption and charitable contributions,12 gift 
taxes,13 and the first time home buyer credit under IRC § 36.14 As one 
commentator, discussing the important and complex area of corporate 
reorganizations, put it 50 years ago, “it is difficult to exaggerate the importance 
of the step-transaction doctrine.”15 
The step transaction doctrine and economic substance doctrine have 
similar goals, but even after codification of the economic substance doctrine, 
the step transaction doctrine has a role to play.16 At times, courts implicitly 
have used the step transaction doctrine to aggregate multiple steps or to 
disaggregate a single transaction into a series of steps and then evaluate 
the resulting steps under the economic substance doctrine.17 In this way, 
courts and the IRS may apply the step transaction doctrine to determine 
the contours of the “transaction” before considering whether that 
transaction has economic substance.18 Furthermore, the codification of the 
economic substance doctrine did not alter the doctrine itself—it merely set 
the common law doctrine of 2010 in stone.19 Congress codified the 
                                                                                                             
 11. See generally CNT Inv’rs, L.L.C. v. Comm’r, 144 T.C. 161 (2015); 
Superior Trading, L.L.C. v. Comm’r, 137 T.C. 70 (2011). 
 12. See generally Gunkle v. Comm’r, 753 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2014). 
 13. See generally Linton v. United States, 630 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 14. See generally Rodriguez v. Comm’r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1599 (2011). 
 15. John T. Sapienza, Tax Considerations in Corporate Reorganizations and 
Mergers, 60 NW. U. L. REV. 765, 783 (1966). In illustrating the step transaction 
doctrine’s “long and distinguished history,” one commentator notes that it “has 
become a central feature in income tax adjudication. Its use is particularly 
pronounced in the corporate income tax area of the law. Courts skillfully apply 
this doctrine to see the forest rather than taxpayers’ deliberately planted trees that 
would otherwise camouflage their carefully laid tax avoidance schemes.” Jay A. 
Soled, Use of Judicial Doctrines in Resolving Transfer Tax Controversies, 42 
B.C. L. REV. 587, 597–98 (2001); see also Yoram Keinan, Rethinking the Role of 
the Judicial Step Transaction Principle and a Proposal for Codification, 22 
AKRON TAX J. 45, 45–49 (1994) (describing the important role the step transaction 
doctrine and other judicial doctrines have played in challenging corporate tax 
avoidance schemes).  
 16. Philip J. Levine & Britt M. Haxton, “The End Result Test” Revisited, 
Part 1, TAX NOTES 1259, 1260–61 (2015). 
 17. See Thomas C. Vanik, Jr., Torpedoing a Transaction: Economic Substance 
Versus Other Tax Doctrines and the Application of the Strict Liability Penalty, 64 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 109, 128 (2015). 
 18. Id. 
 19. See generally Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Living With the Codified Economic 
Substance Doctrine, TAX NOTES (Aug. 17, 2010), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-
notes-today/accounting-periods-and-methods/living-codified-economic-substance-
doctrine/2010/08/17/wbd1 [https://perma.cc/7F96-LAXB]; Mark E. Berg, Tax 




economic substance doctrine at IRC § 7701(o) in the Health Care and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010.20 That Act’s legislative history stated 
that IRC § 7701(o) “does not change present law standards in determining 
when to utilize an economic substance analysis.”21 The statute is to be 
applied “in the same manner as if [§ 7701(o)] had never been enacted.”22  
The step transaction doctrine provides that the courts may combine 
two or more allegedly separate steps in a multi-step transaction into a 
single step to better reflect the economic reality of the taxpayer’s actions.23 
The doctrine often is applied to protect the underlying purpose of statutory 
provisions.24 It usually, but not always,25 is asserted by the IRS to attack 
allegedly artificial divisions of transactions by taxpayers trying to 
characterize recognition events—that is, events that result in a taxable sale 
or exchange—as nonrecognition events or, more rarely, taxpayers trying 
to protect nonrecognition events from characterization as recognition 
events. The step transaction doctrine, like the use of a system of annual 
accounting, is partly a doctrine to address the often amorphous nature of 
business affairs. Transactions do not always have a clear beginning or 
ending. Often, businesses have longstanding relationships with other 
businesses, and it is hard to determine when one transaction ends and 
another begins. Yet such divisions are necessary to a realization-based 
system of taxation, such as the American system.26  
                                                                                                             
Planning in the ‘Economic Substance’ Era, TAX NOTES (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www 
.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/tax-avoidance-and-evasion/tax-planning-economic-  
substance-era/2015/10/06/fyvg [https://perma.cc/S9BN-QMJN]. 
 20. McMahon, Jr., supra note 19; see also I.R.C. § 7701(o) (2012). 
 21. McMahon, Jr., supra note 19 (citing STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON 
TAXATION, 152 (JCX-18-10), TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE 
PROVISIONS OF THE RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010, AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION 
WITH THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (J. Comm. Print 
2010)). 
 22. § 7701(o)(5)(C). 
 23. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 5, ¶ 4.3.5. 
 24. Id.  
 25. See King Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511 (Ct. Cl. 1969), for 
an example of a taxpayer assertion of the doctrine. See also BITTKER & LOKKEN, 
supra note 5, ¶ 4.3.5 at 4-51(“Although step transaction cases often are concerned 
with whether the tax consequences of a particular step with significant legal or 
business consequences should be determined by treating it as part of a larger 
single transaction, there are also many cases where particular steps in an 
integrated transaction are disregarded as transitory events or empty formalities.”). 
 26. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 5, ¶ 4.3.5, at 4-48 (“Because business 
transactions often have no sharp beginning or clearly defined end and because 
income must be computed annually, it is often necessary to divide a transaction 




The three tests regularly used by courts in applying the step transaction 
doctrine are the binding commitment test, the interdependence test, and 
the end result test. The binding commitment test requires that for the 
multiple steps to be integrated “there must be a binding commitment to 
take the later steps.”27 The interdependence test “requires an inquiry as to 
‘whether on a reasonable interpretation of objective facts the steps were so 
interdependent that the legal relations created by one transaction would 
have been fruitless without a completion of the series.’”28 The end result 
test provides that “purportedly separate transactions will be amalgamated 
into a single transaction when it appears that they were really component 
parts of a single transaction intended from the outset to be taken for the 
purpose of reaching the ultimate result.”29  
One example of the function of the step transaction doctrine is in the 
context of Code § 351, which provides for tax-free treatment for transferors 
to a corporation who emerge with control of the corporation.30 Code § 351 
is meant to prevent businesses from being taxed upon incorporation.31 
                                                                                                             
into its constituent elements for tax purposes.”); see also Joshua D. Rosenberg, 
Tax Avoidance and Income Measurement, 87 MICH. L. REV. 365, 448–49 (1988) 
(“A determination of what transaction has occurred ought to rest only on the legal 
relationships among the parties. A significant reason for basing taxation on 
transactions rather than on economic income is that economic relationships are 
simply too difficult to measure; on the other hand, legal relationships are generally 
clear-cut and readily determinable.”) (citations omitted). 
 27. This “binding commitment” is usually a contractual obligation. See 
Comm’r v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 96 (1968); see also McDonald’s Rests. v. 
Comm’r, 688 F.2d 520, 525 (7th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).  
 28. King Enters., 418 F.2d at 516 (quoting RANDOLPH E. PAUL & PHILIP 
ZIMET, STEP TRANSACTIONS, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 200, 254 
(2d Series 1938)); see, e.g., Am. Bantam Car Co. v. Comm’r, 11 T.C. 397 (1948), 
aff’d per curiam, 177 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1949); Manhattan Bldg. Co. v. Comm’r, 27 
T.C. 1032, 1042 (1957) (acq.).  
 29. King Enters., 418 F.2d at 516 (quoting DAVID R. HERWITZ, BUSINESS 
PLANNING 804 (1966)). Several cases cite King Enterprises on this point. See Sec. 
Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir. 1983); Penrod v. Comm’r, 
88 T.C. 1415 (1987); see also Crenshaw v. Comm’r, 450 F.2d 472, 475 (5th Cir. 
1971) (“[T]he tax consequences of an interrelated series of transactions are not to 
be determined by viewing each of them in isolation but by considering them 
together as component parts of an overall plan.”). 
 30. See I.R.C. § 351(a) (2012) (“Control” is defined as “at least 80 percent of 
the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 
80 percent of the total number of shares of all other classes of stock of the 
corporation.”); see also id. § 368(c).  
 31. See Ronald H. Jensen, Of Form and Substance: Tax-Free Incorporations 
and Other Transactions under Section 351, 11 VA. TAX REV. 349, 384–86 (1991).  




Consider the consequences if George transfers property with a basis of ten 
dollars and a fair market value of $100 in exchange for 100 shares of 
Newco, Inc (“Newco”) and ten days later he sells 40 shares to Isabella for 
$40. If the two transactions are considered separately, George will be 
deemed first to have made a tax-free contribution to the corporation 
followed by a sale of 40 shares to Isabella. He will be taxed on the gain of 
$36 arising from the second transaction. If, however, the two transactions 
are considered part of a plan, George’s initial contribution will be fully 
taxable, and George will have a gain of $90 because, at the end of the two 
steps, George, the only transferor, will own less than 80% of the shares of 
Newco. 
This Article argues that courts should reformulate the binding 
commitment, interdependence, and end result tests as two objective tests: 
(1) an objective test for arms-length transactions based on the law of offer 
and acceptance (hereinafter, “objective test”); and (2) an economic reality 
test for transactions between related parties. For arms-length transactions, 
the objective test asks whether the parties’ actions, as demonstrated by 
documentary evidence or other admissible evidence regarding contractual 
obligations, manifest a mutual intention that a series of transactions should 
be combined into a single transaction. As with the objective test from 
contract law, when applying this proposed objective test, the trier of fact 
looks to the ordinary meaning of terms in documents and the understanding 
of actions that a reasonable person in the position of the other party would 
have.32 For related-party transactions, the economic reality test draws upon 
the articulation of the interdependence test in True v. United States and asks 
whether each step has a “‘reasoned economic justification standing alone.’”33 
As with the economic reality test in differentiating a true lease from a 
financing arrangement, the trier of fact focuses not on the intent of the 
parties—with the related parties’ intent being too easily disguised—but on 
whether hypothetically unrelated parties facing similar economic and 
business constraints would construct the transaction with a similar series 
of steps. 
These new tests provide conceptual clarity and promote predictability 
while simultaneously protecting the public treasury. The new tests borrow 
concepts from contract and commercial law and demonstrate that tax law 
shares similar concerns with other areas of law, a proposition that 
sometimes is doubted.34 This Article contends that the step transaction 
                                                                                                             
 32. See infra notes 367–368 and accompanying text.  
 33. True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1178 (1999) (quoting Sec. Indus. 
Ins. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1234, 1247 (5th Cir. 1983)).  
 34. See infra notes 496–498 and accompanying text. 




doctrine, as reformulated, should be available for assertion by taxpayers 
in transactions between unrelated parties. Acknowledging the availability 
of the test for assertion by taxpayers will have the salutary effect of 
aligning the description of doctrine with its application. 
Part I provides background regarding the judicial development of the 
step transaction doctrine and scholarly efforts to provide a conceptual 
framework. Part II elaborates on the proposed new tests and the offensive 
use of the step transaction doctrine as well as the implications of adopting 
the new tests. Part III points to fruitful avenues for future exploration, 
connecting some of the specific issues discussed in this Article to broader 
themes in legal theory. 
I. BACKGROUND ON JUDICIAL DOCTRINES 
Initially, courts did not welcome the government’s attempts to 
recharacterize a transaction, as evidenced by Judge Learned Hand’s oft-
cited statement that “there is nothing sinister in so arranging one’s affairs 
as to keep taxes as low as possible.”35 Around the same time that Judge 
Hand made this famous statement, another doctrine arose that similarly 
aimed at limiting the scope of tax law: the doctrine of construing the tax 
code strictly against the government in the way that a contract is construed 
against the drafter.36 One of the earliest cases to apply that doctrine was Old 
Colony Railroad Co. v. Commissioner,37 a fundamental case in defining the 
scope of the income tax and one that is excerpted in basic federal income 
tax casebooks. Specifically, in Old Colony Railroad Co., the United States 
Supreme Court stated, “[When there is] doubt as to [the] connotation of 
[a] term, and another meaning might be adopted, the fact of its use in a tax 
                                                                                                             
 35. Comm’r v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850–51 (2d Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J., 
dissenting). Judge Hand’s quote continues to be cited by courts today, including 
the Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson/Ctr. Arms Co., 504 U.S. 
505, 511 n.4 (1992) (Souter, J.) (“In our system, avoidance of a tax by remaining 
outside the ambit of the law that imposes it is every person’s right. ‘Over and over 
again courts have said that there is nothing sinister in so arranging one’s affairs as 
to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do right, 
for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands: taxes are 
enforced exactions, not voluntary contributions. To demand more in the name of 
morals is mere cant.’”); see also Edward A. Morse, Reflections on the Rule of Law 
and Clear Reflection of Income: What Constrains Discretion, 8 CORNELL J. L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 445, 465 (1999). 
 36. See William S. Blatt, Lost on a One-Way Street: The Taxpayer’s Ability 
to Disavow Form, 70 OR. L. REV. 381, 387–88 (noting that a majority of courts 
favored strict construction in the early Twentieth century).  
 37. Old Colony R.R. Co. v. Comm’r, 284 U.S. 552 (1932). 




statute would incline the scale to the construction most favorable to the 
taxpayer.”38 In other cases, the Supreme Court upheld the principle that 
“[i]f the words [of a statute] are doubtful, the doubt must be resolved 
against the [g]overnment and in favor of the taxpayer.”39 
Not long after these cases, the Supreme Court abandoned a strict 
interpretation of tax statutes and shifted to an attitude of construing tax 
laws liberally so as to prevent a taxpayer from avoiding tax through her 
chosen method of stock disposition.40 All of the major modern judicial 
doctrines are rooted in a series of early Supreme Court decisions. In those 
early cases, the Supreme Court did not delineate clearly between the 
different doctrines and used doctrine-specific language interchangeably.  
A. Common Roots of the Judicial Doctrines 
In Gregory v. Helvering, often classified as one of the earliest 
Supreme Court cases defining judicial doctrines, the Court decided that 
the transaction at issue was entered into without a business purpose and 
thus was not a reorganization as the term was used in the statute.41 The 
Court’s language in Gregory demonstrates both how the Court understood 
the transaction and how the Court was unwilling to rely on a literal reading 
of the statutory language. First, the Court found that the transaction was 
[s]imply an operation having no business or corporate purpose—
a mere device which put on the form of a corporate reorganization 
as a disguise for concealing its real character, and the sole object 
and accomplishment of which was the consummation of a 
preconceived plan not to reorganize a business or any part of a 
business, but to transfer a parcel of corporate shares . . . .42 
                                                                                                             
 38. Id. at 561 (citations omitted). 
 39. United States v. Merriam, 263 U.S. 179, 188 (1923) (income tax); see 
also Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U.S. 498, 508 (1932) (excise tax). 
 40. See Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935) (Helvering was the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. At that time, the last name of the Commissioner 
was used in case names. More recent cases use the title “Commissioner.”); see also 
John F. Cloverdale, Text As Limit: A Plea for a Decent Respect for the Tax Code, 
71 TUL. L. REV. 1501, 1522 (1997) (quoting Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 61 
(1930) to show the Court’s former practice of strict construction—a trend replaced 
by liberal construction in the government’s favor).  
 41. See Gregory, 293 U.S. at 469. See generally Yoram Keinan, The 
Economic Substance Doctrine, 47 TAX MGMT. MEMORANDUM 259 (June 26, 
2006); BITTKER AND LOKKEN, supra note 5, ¶ 4.3 (Pervasive Judicial Doctrines). 
 42. Gregory, 293 U.S at 469. 




The Court then held that although the taxpayer’s motivation to avoid 
taxation “will not alter the result or make unlawful what the statute 
allows,” the transaction was not a “reorganization” within the meaning of 
the statute because 
[t]he whole undertaking, though conducted according to the terms 
of [the applicable statute], was in fact an elaborate and devious 
form of conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization, 
and nothing else. The rule which excludes from consideration the 
motive of tax avoidance is not pertinent to the situation, because 
the transaction upon its face lies outside the plain intent of the 
statute. To hold otherwise would be to exalt artifice above reality 
and to deprive the statutory provision in question of all serious 
purpose.43 
The Court held in favor of the Commissioner and, in the process, denominated 
the substance over form doctrine by describing the Commissioner’s position 
in the following manner: “the reorganization attempted was without 
substance and must be disregarded.”44 
Interestingly, Judge Hand authored the Second Circuit opinion in 
Helvering v. Gregory. He began by noting, in language that he would revisit 
in future opinions, that “[a]ny one may so arrange his affairs that his taxes 
shall be as low as possible.”45 As he continued, however, he eviscerated any 
notion of strictly construing a tax statute against the government. After 
accepting the principle that there was “not even a patriotic duty to increase 
one’s taxes,” Judge Hand made an about-face and stated, 
Nevertheless, it does not follow that Congress meant to cover such 
a transaction, not even though the facts answer the dictionary 
definitions of each term used in the statutory definition . . . the 
meaning of a sentence may be more than that of the separate words 
. . . and no degree of particularity can ever obviate recourse to the 
setting in which all appear, and which all collectively create.46  
Judge Hand concluded by highlighting the purpose of the statute: 
The purpose of the section is plain enough; men engaged in 
enterprises . . . might wish to consolidate . . . their holdings . . . . 
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But the underlying presupposition is plain that the readjustment 
shall be undertaken for reasons germane to the conduct of the 
venture in hand . . . . To dodge the shareholders’ taxes is not one 
of the transactions contemplated as corporate reorganizations.47  
Thus, Judge Hand held that a transaction might satisfy a plain reading of 
each word of the statute and still be invalid because the transaction evades 
the purpose of the statute.  
A few years later, in Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,48 the 
Supreme Court denominated both the substance over form and the step 
transaction doctrines. In Court Holding Co., the taxpayer-corporation was 
wholly owned by a husband and wife.49 The husband and wife negotiated 
on behalf of the taxpayer-corporation for the sale of taxpayer-corporation’s 
only asset, an apartment building, to the lessees of the building.50 After the 
sale negotiations were complete and an oral agreement was reached, the 
corporation’s attorney realized that a sale by the corporation would result 
in a large tax on the corporation.51 Therefore, the parties decided to 
liquidate the corporation, distribute its assets, and the husband and wife 
would surrender its stock.52 The parties took these steps, and the corporation 
deeded the property to the husband and wife.53 They then sold the apartment 
building in their marital capacity to the lessees, applying a payment of 
$1,000 from the lessees to the corporation to discount the purchase price.54 
The Court held that the corporation had, in fact, sold the property.55  
The Court, again, used broad language to describe the determination 
of the tax consequences of transactions. The Court began by noting that 
“[t]he incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a 
transaction.”56 The Court continued: 
The tax consequences which arise from gains from a sale of 
property are not finally to be determined solely by the means 
employed to transfer legal title. Rather, the transaction must be 
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viewed as a whole, and each step, from the commencement of 
negotiations to the consummation of the sale, is relevant.57  
The Court then stated, 
A sale by one person cannot be transformed for tax purposes into 
a sale by another by using the latter as a conduit through which to 
pass title. To permit the true nature of a transaction to be disguised 
by mere formalisms, which exist solely to alter tax liabilities, 
would seriously impair the effective administration of the tax 
policies of Congress.58  
In these few sentences, the Court not only created—and conflated—the 
substance over form and step transaction doctrines, but it also raised the 
important questions asked when determining whether either of these 
doctrines applies in a given case and when determining the contour of the 
doctrines themselves.  
Finally, the Court insisted on the primacy of “substance” over “mere 
formalisms.”59 The Court disregarded the account of the transaction 
provided by a legal document—the title to the property—because tax 
consequences did not necessarily follow the non-tax legal structure, especially 
when one party acted as a conduit for another party.60 The Court insisted that 
a transaction should be viewed holistically, although each step is relevant.61  
B. The Step Transaction Doctrine 
Although the step transaction doctrine originated in the same 
jurisprudence as the other judicial doctrines, the step transaction doctrine 
has its own specific heritage and requirements. In one of the earliest cases, 
the Board of Tax Appeal, the forerunner of the Tax Court, framed the 
doctrine as an interpretive device for giving effect to the words of the 
statute.62 The Board stated that “the phrase ‘in connection with a 
reorganization’ permits, if it does not require, an examination of the several 
steps taken which culminated in the taxpayer’s acquisition of the . . . 
assets.”63 The Board proceeded to describe the plan for the acquisition of 
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the assets and examine its “substance and effect.”64 The Board ultimately 
concluded that the steps of the petitioner’s plan were separate and rejected 
the Commissioner’s assertion that the steps were all part of a single plan 
of reorganization.65 
An early Supreme Court case articulated the purpose of the step 
transaction doctrine: “A given result at the end of a straight path is not 
made a different result because reached by following a devious path.”66 
The step transaction doctrine requires that a “transaction must be viewed 
as a whole” when a series of steps is used to “consummat[e] a sale” or 
otherwise complete a business transaction.67 The step transaction doctrine 
is necessary because the point at which one business transaction begins 
and another ends never is clearly defined.68 Time, however, is not the only 
factor; the doctrine has been applied to events that are as far apart in time 
as five years, and courts have declined to apply the doctrine to events 
spanning only 30 minutes apart.69 
The courts apply three primary tests when determining whether to 
apply the step transaction doctrine: (1) the binding commitment test; (2) 
the interdependence test; and (3) the end result test.70 
1. The Binding Commitment Test 
The classic fact pattern for the binding commitment test is the two-
step merger described in Revenue Ruling 2001-46.71 In that ruling, two 
fact patterns existed with the same two steps: the merger of a subsidiary 
of the acquirer into the target corporation followed by the merger of the 
surviving target corporation into the acquiring corporation.72 These steps 
comprised an “integrated plan.”73 The parties agreed in advance that both 
steps would take place and that the second step would immediately follow 
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the first.74 The first step would not have occurred without the second 
step.75 A second fact pattern that implicates the binding commitment test 
is when the board of directors passes a resolution to accomplish in two 
steps something that could be accomplished just as easily in a single step.76  
2. The Interdependence Test 
Courts apply the interdependence test to combine separate steps that 
are “so interdependent that the legal relations created by one transaction 
would have been fruitless without a completion of the series” and in which 
“it is unlikely that any one step would have been undertaken except in 
contemplation of the other integrating acts.”77 In Security Industrial 
Insurance Co. v. United States, the court of appeals applied the interdependence 
test in a situation in which an insurance company acquired two target 
corporations for cash through a series of steps—very similar in each 
transaction—that the acquiring insurance company claimed qualified first as 
a purchase of shares and second as a reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(F).78 
E.J. Ourso was the controlling shareholder and chief executive officer of 
taxpayer Security Industrial Insurance Co. (“Security”).79 Security’s primary 
growth strategy was acquisition of rivals.80 The taxpayer decided to target 
Southern Life Insurance Co. (“Southern”) for acquisition.81 Lenders would 
not finance the acquisition, however, because of a deficit in Security’s 
insurance accounting.82 Ultimately, a lender was found, but the lender 
required that Ourso form a holding company, Ourso Investment Co. 
(“OIC”), and demanded as collateral for the loan the stock of OIC and 
Security as well as a personal guarantee from Ourso.83 In addition to 
owning shares of the taxpayer, OIC owned funeral homes and real estate.84 
On December 9, 1970, the majority shareholders of Southern and OIC 
executed a purchase agreement for the Southern shares.85 During their 
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meeting on January 2, 1971, OIC’s directors “resolved to acquire the 
Southern shares, to borrow the necessary funds from Security and the 
Bank, and to liquidate Southern and reinsure its outstanding policies 
following the acquisition.”86 Within the next few days, OIC purchased all 
of Southern’s stock, and Ourso was appointed as liquidator of Southern.87 
Ourso, as liquidator, entered into a reinsurance agreement with Security, 
and Security assumed all of Southern’s outstanding policies and received 
from Southern sufficient assets to reserve against the assumed risks.88 
Security also agreed to pay OIC in consideration for OIC’s consent to 
Security’s reinsurance agreement with Southern.89 In January 1971, 
Southern’s assets and liabilities were transferred from its books onto 
OIC’s books.90 OIC then converted Southern’s surplus and net worth into 
cash, used the proceeds to pay off a portion of OIC’s loan, and transferred 
Southern’s assets to Security.91 In June 1971, Southern filed its final 
federal tax return, and Southern was dissolved under state law in 
December 1971.92 
During the summer and fall of 1971, Security used similar methods to 
acquire Standard Life Insurance Co. (“Standard”).93 On October 19, 1971, 
OIC’s directors “resolved to acquire the Standard shares, to borrow the 
funds necessary to finance the purchase, and to liquidate Standard and 
reinsure its outstanding policies following the acquisition.”94 OIC became 
Standard’s sole shareholder within a week and resolved to liquidate 
Standard, appoint Ourso as liquidator, and reinsure Standard’s policies 
with Security.95 Security and OIC entered into an agreement, which 
provided for payments from Security to OIC as consideration for consent 
to a reinsurance agreement between Security and Standard.96 At the end of 
1971, “Standard’s assets and liabilities were transferred onto OIC’s 
books.”97 In April 1972, Standard filed its final federal tax return, and in 
May 1972, Standard was dissolved under state law.98 
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The issue in the case was whether the purported tax-free corporate 
reorganizations satisfied the continuity of interest requirement, which 
provides that the owners of the acquired corporation must retain equity 
interests in the surviving corporation after a reorganization.99 The requirement 
is intended to prevent taxpayers from receiving tax-free treatment for the sale 
of a corporation for cash.100 The taxpayer argued—and the district court 
agreed—that continuity of interest should be tested at the time of the merger 
of Southern and Standard into Security.101 At that point, OIC owned 100% 
of all of the corporations involved.102 The government argued that the 
stock purchases and reinsurance agreements entered into by OIC were all 
intermediate steps that were part of the same plan to purchase Southern 
and Standard for cash and not to effectuate reorganizations.103 The 
government pointed out that at the end of all of the transactions, all of the 
former shareholders of Southern and Standard received only cash and did 
not have equity interests in OIC or Security.104 
The court of appeals provided a clear articulation of the business and 
economic underpinnings of the interdependence test. The court noted that 
the purpose of the test was to determine “whether the individual steps in a 
series had independent significance or whether they had meaning only as 
part of the larger transaction.”105 The court then stated that it would 
“examine this tandem of transactional totalities to determine whether each 
step had a reasoned economic justification standing alone.”106 The court 
commented that the transactions in this case were “dependent for [their] 
success” upon each other and were “meaningless” in isolation.107 The 
court of appeals found that the holding company was a mere shell.108 The 
court further found that the purchases of the two targets would have been 
impossible without liquidating them because the bank financing 
agreements were dependent on the reinsurance agreements and contingent 
payment agreements.109 Without the reinsurance agreements and 
contingent payment agreements, the holding company would not have 
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been able to satisfy its debt to the bank.110 Therefore, the court held that 
the transactions could not be separated into a stock purchase and an F 
Reorganization.111 Rather, they were properly treated holistically as an 
asset sale.112 Thus, what actually occurred was an asset sale, triggering 
certain insurance taxes based upon inclusion of income from 
policyholders’ surplus accounts.113 
3. The End Result Test 
The end result test examines the intent of the parties, and “purportedly 
separate transactions are to be amalgamated when the successive steps 
were designed and executed as part of a plan to achieve an intended 
result.”114 In Security Industrial Insurance Co.,115 the court applied both 
the end result test and the interdependence test.116 In applying the end 
result test to the facts of the case, the court noted that there were a large 
number of intermediate steps before the final corporate structure was 
achieved but that “all these machinations cannot disguise the fact that the 
intended result of each series of transactions was the acquisition of [the 
target insurance companies’] assets by [the acquiring insurance 
company].”117 The court further stated that the acquiring insurance company 
and its parent holding company “left a clear and well-documented paper trail 
to this effect” and that the acquiring insurance company had pursued a 
strategy of acquiring rivals for cash in an “identical” fashion for over 20 
years through the same method of “liquidate the rival company and gobble 
up the assets.”118 
In one of the most frequently cited and debated cases involving the 
application of the end result test,119 King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 
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the taxpayer was a corporation that, at the time of trial, held and managed 
various investments but previously had been a seller of roasted coffee.120 
It also previously was one of 11 shareholders of Tenco, Inc. (“Tenco”), a 
producer of soluble coffee.121 At that time, Minute Maid Corporation 
(“MM”), a producer of frozen concentrated citrus juices, was looking to 
acquire corporations in other industries to stabilize its income.122  
Between January and July 1959, MM made three separate proposals 
to the directors of Tenco to acquire Tenco’s stock.123 Tenco’s directors 
rejected all three proposals.124 On August 25, 1959, the two boards 
approved a fourth proposal.125 On September 3, 1959, MM and the Tenco 
board and shareholders signed a purchase and sale agreement.126 At closing, 
the Tenco shareholders received “$3,000,000 in cash, $2,550,000 in 
promissory notes, and 311,996 shares of [MM] stock valued at 
$5,771,926.”127 The taxpayer’s “share of the total consideration consisted of 
$281,564.25 in cash, $239,329.40 in promissory notes, and 29,282 shares of 
Minute Maid stock valued at $541,717.”128 In total, the Tenco shareholders 
received MM stock representing more than 50% of the value of the 
aggregate consideration received in the acquisition, which represented 
approximately 15% of the outstanding MM stock.129  
On December 10, 1959, the MM directors approved a November 24 
recommendation of MM’s general counsel to merge MM’s four 
subsidiaries, including Tenco, into MM.130 The merger was to be submitted 
to MM stockholders for approval at a meeting scheduled for February 
1960.131 MM announced the merger in its annual report to stockholders in 
December 1959.132 On February 25, 1960, the Commissioner ruled 
favorably133 that the liquidation of Tenco would qualify as a subsidiary 
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liquidation under then-existing § 332, and, therefore, the basis of the 
property received by MM would be determined based on MM’s basis in 
its Tenco stock pursuant to then-existing § 334.134 On April 30, 1960 and 
May 2, 1960, Tenco and other subsidiaries were merged into MM.135 For 
the fiscal year ending on June 30, 1960, the taxpayer reported the cash and 
notes received as dividend income subject to the intercorporate dividends 
received deduction.136  
Taxpayer King Enterprises, Inc. took the position that the MM stock 
was received in connection with a nontaxable corporate reorganization.137 
The IRS contended that the stock was received in exchange for a sale of a 
capital asset.138 The court found for the taxpayer and held that the ultimate 
merger of Tenco into MM was “the intended result of the transaction in 
question from the outset” and “the initial exchange of stock constitut[ed] 
a mere transitory step.”139 The court provided the classic articulation of the 
end result test: “purportedly separate transactions will be amalgamated 
into a single transaction when it appears that they were really component 
parts of a single transaction intended from the outset to be taken for the 
purpose of reaching the ultimate result.”140 The court inferred the result in 
this case even though it admitted that no explicit testimony existed in the 
record that showed that, at the time of the initial purchase, the Tenco 
shareholders knew that MM intended to consummate an upstream merger 
after the purchase.141 The court noted that the merger took place too close 
to the acquisition to believe that the parties did not intend the merger and 
acquisition to be part of the same plan.142 The court also implicitly rejected 
the notion that taxpayers may apply only the “binding commitment test” 
                                                                                                             
regarding the tax consequences of a transaction in advance of the transaction. See 
id. The taxpayer must provide a full disclosure of all relevant facts and provide a 
description of the relevant law and legal reasoning supporting the requested tax 
treatment. See id. 
 134.  King Enters., 418 F.2d at 514. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 519. 
 140. Id. at 516 (citation omitted). 
 141. Id. at 519. 
 142. See id. The court did not conclude that some sort of detailed plan existed; 
the court concluded only that “[i]t strains credulity, however, to believe other than 
that the plan to merge was something more than inchoate, if something less than 
announced, at the time of such exchange.” Id. 




when asserting the step transaction doctrine “offensively,” but the IRS 
may apply any of the tests.143 
The end result test also is applied in, and well-suited for, cases 
involving related entities, especially those under common control with 
one, or very few, owners. Without need for interrelated documentation, 
the owners of such entities can separate transactions into multiple tax-
advantaged steps while still achieving the same economic outcome. True 
v. United States144 is a good example of related party dealings.  
In True v. United States, taxpayers—all members of the same 
family—controlled several entities, including True Ranches, Smokey Oil 
Co., and True Oil Co.145 True Ranches was a partnership engaged in 
ranching and other activities.146 Smokey Oil Co. was a corporation 
engaged in oil and gas production and exploration.147 True Oil Co. was a 
partnership engaged in oil and gas production and exploration.148 In 
several similar transactions, the entities controlled by the Trues acquired 
certain ranch properties.149 First, Smokey Oil Co. would purchase the 
parcels.150 Then, True Ranches would acquire the operating assets of the 
ranch that sat on each parcel.151 Subsequently, Smokey Oil Co. would 
transfer the parcels to True Oil Co. in exchange for existing oil and gas 
leases.152 True Oil Co. then distributed the parcels to the family members 
as tenants in common.153 As the final step in the transactions, the family 
members contributed their undivided interest in the parcels to True 
Ranches.154  
The taxpayers claimed that the transactions should be characterized as 
an acquisition of the parcels, followed by a tax-free like-kind exchange 
pursuant to Code § 1031, followed by a tax-free contribution to a 
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partnership pursuant to Code §§ 721 and 731.155 A taxpayer’s basis in 
assets received in a like-kind exchange equals the basis of the asset that 
taxpayer exchanged.156 Therefore, under the taxpayers’ theory, the result 
of this series of transactions was that Smokey Oil Co. received depletable 
oil and gas leases with the same basis as it had in the land it had 
acquired.157 At the same time, the land which was now held by the 
partnership had a zero basis because the oil and gas leases already were 
fully depleted and had a zero basis.158 Thus, Smokey Oil Co. was able to 
claim depletion on assets that already had been fully depleted after it 
received such assets in exchange for non-depreciable assets, that is, 
land.159 
The court highlighted that the Trues admitted that their intent “from 
the beginning” was “to ultimately place the ranch properties in the hands 
of True Ranches.”160 The court dismissed the taxpayers’ argument that 
Smokey Oil Co. had more liquid assets to acquire the parcels, and, thus, 
there was some business purpose and economic effect to the structure that 
precluded application of the step transaction doctrine.161 The court held 
that although the “absence of economic effects or business purposes may 
be fatal to a taxpayer’s step transaction” argument, the existence of a 
“business purpose[] by itself does not preclude application of the step 
transaction doctrine.”162 The court emphasized that no apparent business 
purpose existed in Smokey Oil Co. and True Oil Co. being involved in the 
purchase of ranchlands as neither of these companies were in the ranching 
business.163 
4. The Relationship Between the Three Tests 
In McDonald’s Restaurants of Illinois v. Commissioner,164 the court 
concluded that the transaction at issue should be stepped together—that is, 
combined pursuant to the step transaction doctrine—under each of the 
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three tests.165 The court both defined and applied each of the three tests.166 
It held that the district court applied each test properly to step together the 
transaction at issue.167 The court provided a classic alternative hypothetical 
definition of the interdependence test and broader definition of the binding 
commitment test.168 The taxpayers in McDonald’s Restaurants of Illinois were 
27 wholly owned subsidiaries of McDonald’s Corporation (“McDonald’s”).169 
The issue was whether the acquisition of the 27 subsidiaries was a tax-free 
reorganization followed by a sale of shares by the former owners of the 
subsidiaries—at the time, independent franchises—or simply one integrated 
sale of the independent franchises for cash.170 The court held that the 
acquisition was a sale for cash because of the ability of the shareholders to 
register their shares and the connection of that registration to a desire to 
cash out their interests in McDonald’s.171 
The Garb-Stern group, the owners of the independent franchises, had 
significant disagreements with McDonald’s.172 McDonald’s wanted to 
acquire the independent franchises in a way that would allow it to use a 
“pooling of interests” for accounting purposes.173 McDonald’s could use 
only the “pooling of interests” method of accounting if all of the interests 
were acquired in one transaction for stock.174 The Garb-Stern group, however, 
wanted cash for its interests.175 The Garb-Stern group companies merged into 
McDonald’s in a Delaware statutory merger on April 1, 1973.176 The assets 
received in the merger were transferred to the 27 subsidiaries, the taxpayers 
in the case.177 The Garb-Stern group received 361,235 shares of unregistered 
common stock.178 The Garb-Stern group was entitled to participate in the 
anticipated June 1973 registration and in any other registration that might 
occur within six years of the closing.179 The Garb-Stern group also had a 
one-time right to force registration if McDonald’s did not seek registration 
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within one year of the closing.180 The June registration was postponed 
because of a negative report about McDonald’s stock, and the shares 
ultimately were registered as part of a registration announced on 
September 17 and completed on October 3.181 The price per share was $60 
immediately before the time that the June registration was to take place.182 
The share price dropped to $52 after the negative report.183 The Garb-Stern 
group ultimately sold almost all of its shares after the registration for more 
than $71 per share.184 
The court quoted King Enterprises for its definition of the end result 
test.185 The court held that “there can be little doubt that all the steps were 
taken to cash out the Garb-Stern group,”186 even though the court noted 
that “McDonald’s sought to do so in a way that would enable it to use 
certain accounting procedures.”187 The court acknowledged that it derived 
its conclusion from the “history of the parties’ relationships, the abortive 
attempt to buy some of the group’s holdings, the final comprehensive deal, 
and the Garb-Stern group’s determination to sell out even in the face of 
falling prices in the stock.”188 
The court cited Redding v. Commissioner for its definition of the 
interdependence test: “the steps are so interdependent that the legal relations 
created by one transaction would have been fruitless without a completion 
of the series.”189 The court of appeals criticized the Tax Court for limiting 
the interdependence test to circumstances in which the Garb-Stern group 
would have been “legally bound to sell its stock.”190 The court provided 
that the interdependence test is “more practical and less legalistic than 
that” and that the test “concentrates on the relationship between the 
steps.”191 The court applied the interdependence test to “ask whether the 
merger would have taken place without the guarantees of saleability, and 
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the answer is certainly no.”192 The court emphasized the Garb-Stern 
group’s “insistence” on saleability as shown by its “historic stance” in the 
negotiations and the terms of the agreement.193 The court also emphasized 
the Garb-Stern group’s “one-time right to force registration” and therefore 
found that “free transferability” was the “quid pro quo of the merger 
agreement.”194 
Finally, the court broadened the binding commitment test to appear 
more like the interdependence test.195 The court found that the right to 
force registration—and the fact that this right would be lost if the Garb-
Stern group did not register when given the opportunity—meant that a sale 
was “extremely likely” to “take place promptly.”196 Thus, the court 
substituted likelihood of certain actions occurring for a legally enforceable 
obligation to take those actions.197 
The court explicitly criticized the Commissioner’s position as 
potentially putting future taxpayers in a double bind and creating “heads-
I-win, tails-you-lose law.”198 The court commented that to receive an 
advance ruling on reorganization treatment, taxpayers must represent that 
“there is ‘no plan or intention on the part of the Acquired shareholders to 
[reduce their new holdings] to a number of shares having, in the aggregate, a 
value of less than 50[%] of the total value of the Acquired stock outstanding 
immediately prior to the proposed transaction.’”199 Furthermore, the court 
stated that if the reorganization status were available “without constraining 
post-merger sales,” many new opportunities would exist for manipulative 
and aggressive tax planning, which, the court noted, tax advisors already 
were advertising after the Tax Court’s decision and prior to reversal.200 
In Heintz v. Commissioner,201 the court separated a series of 
transactions that took place over three days.202 The taxpayers were former 
owners of a corporation (“target corporation”) that primarily produced 
aircraft starters and other goods for the Armed Forces during World War 
II.203 The taxpayers felt that the corporation would be unable to transition 
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to civilian production, so they decided to search for a purchaser.204 The 
taxpayers could not locate a buyer willing to pay all cash at their desired 
purchase price of $8 million.205 The best offer that they could find was for 
$5.5 million in cash and $2.5 million of preferred stock.206 As part of the 
negotiations, the purchasing corporation suggested that the target 
corporation should merge into the purchasing corporation.207 The taxpayers 
objected with concerns related to tax consequences, but representatives of 
the purchasing corporation reassured the taxpayers that the tax benefits 
would outweigh any tax costs.208 
A merger agreement was drafted and dated March 5, 1946.209 The 
purchasing corporation adopted the agreement on February 27, 1946; the 
target corporation adopted the agreement on March 2, 1946.210 On March 
4, 1946, the parties signed a stock purchase agreement for the sale of the 
stock of the target corporation to the purchasing corporation for the cash 
and preferred stock.211 On March 5, 1946, a formal closing was held for 
the stock purchase agreement.212 That same day, the previously ratified 
merger agreement was executed.213 The merger was completed on March 
6, 1946.214 
The court held that the sale and merger were separate transactions.215 
Therefore, under the tax law at that time, the taxpayers were entitled to 
treat the sale of the stock of the target corporation as capital gains.216 If the 
two transactions had been stepped together, that is, combined pursuant to 
the step transaction doctrine, the gains would have been ordinary 
income.217 
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5. Recent Cases Applying the Doctrine 
The step transaction doctrine has been applied by courts in recent 
cases in a variety of transactions.218 In Linton v. United States, the Ninth 
Circuit addressed the application of the step transaction doctrine in the 
context of a gift of LLC interests to trusts.219 After Mr. Linton formed his 
LLC, WLFB Investments, and created four trusts for his children, two 
main transactions occurred: (1) the contribution of cash, securities, and 
real property to the LLC; and (2) the assignment of interest of the LLC to 
the four trusts.220 Tax filings showed that contributions were made to Mr. 
and Mrs. Linton’s individual capital accounts in the LLC equally.221 
Filings also showed a transfer of capital from these accounts with a 
“commensurate” increase of capital in the trust accounts.222 The Lintons 
claimed the transfers as gifts of “percentage interest” in WLFB.223 The 
WLFB ledger also showed the capital contribution to the LLC and then 
transfers of percentage interest to the children’s trusts.224 Finally, a share 
valuation report showed an interest in the LLC was transferred to the 
children’s trusts.225 The Lintons’ tax returns showed the date of the transfers 
of percentage interest in the LLC as January 31, 2003.226 Their accounting 
firm’s share valuation report showed the same date.227 The dates in the 
company’s ledger documenting the transactions, however, were left blank.228 
The district court granted summary judgment on the basis of its finding that 
because the trusts and the LLC were created at the same time—January 22, 
2003—the contributions of the capital to the LLC were made either at the 
same time or after the gifts of interest in the LLC were granted, making the 
transfers indirect gifts of cash or property to the trusts.229  
The court of appeals analyzed all three tests of the step transaction 
doctrine.230 Under the end result test, the court considered the Lintons’ 
intent and contemplated whether the Lintons reached their intended result 
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of transferring ownership interest to their children.231 The court found that 
they did reach their desired end result.232 Under the interdependence test, 
the court analyzed whether the “legal relations created by one transaction 
would have been fruitless without a completion of the series.”233 The court 
compared the Lintons’ transaction to a “bona fide” business transaction 
and found the placing of assets into an LLC “reasonable . . . with or without 
any subsequent gift.”234 Finally, the court did not find that the binding 
transaction test applied because the test applied to “transactions spanning 
several years,” which was not the case here.235 The court concluded that 
the IRS was not entitled to summary judgement based on the step 
transaction doctrine and remanded the case to the district court.236 
Superior Trading, LLC v. Commissioner237 was a consolidated case 
concerning many companies and taxpayers involved in distressed 
asset/debt (“DAD”) transactions.238 Warwick, LLC (“Warwick”) entered 
into an agreement to purchase past due accounts receivable from a Brazilian 
consumer goods company, Lojas Arapua, S.A. (“Arapua”).239 Warwick 
assigned interest in the Arapua accounts to 14 different trading companies 
in exchange for a 99% interest in those companies.240 Warwick sold 
interests in the trading companies to United States investors through 
“another set of limited liability companies (holding companies)” by 
transferring “virtually” all of its membership interest to the corresponding 
holding company.241 Warwick, the holding company, and the trading 
companies elected to be treated as partnerships for their income tax returns 
and claimed a basis in the payment receivables from Arapua equal to the 
face amount.242 Soon after the Arapua-Warwick transaction, Arapua 
“redeemed” itself from the partnership it formed with Warwick, but the 
holding companies nonetheless used the face amount of the distressed 
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assets as basis in the receivables.243 United States taxpayers with 
membership in the various holding companies also claimed losses.244  
The court held that Warwick did not have a basis in the Arapua 
accounts receivable because it could not substantiate the payments it made 
to Arapua.245 The court analyzed the transactions under all three step 
transaction doctrine tests.246 The court characterized the tests by their 
degrees of “permissiveness” of “subject[ing] the transaction’s many twists 
and turns” to the court’s analysis from least permissive to most: the 
binding commitment test, the end result test, and the interdependence 
test.247 Under the binding commitment test, the court analyzed whether 
Arapua was assured of its redemption after the contribution of account 
receivables.248 The court found that although the next step—the redemption—
was necessary so that the tax losses were not Arapua’s, not enough time 
passed between the transactions for this test.249 The court then applied the end 
result test and found that “arranging . . . [the] tax benefits required the carefully 
choreographed entry and exit of Arapua.”250 The court also found that the 
interdependence test was appropriate in this case, reasoning that the 
intermediate steps in this case can be “properly collapsed into a single 
transaction” because the redemption did not fit the legitimate purpose 
analysis and the transaction between Arapua and Warwick could just as 
well have been a sale.251  
C. Critical Responses to the Step Transaction Doctrine 
Critics of the step transaction doctrine fall broadly into three 
categories: (1) those that criticize specific applications or interpretations 
of one or more of the three tests;252 (2) those that question the existence of 
one or more of the three tests;253 and (3) those that suggest an entirely new 
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test to replace the current system of tests.254 The criticisms of some 
opponents fall into only one of the categories; others advocate criticisms 
from multiple categories.255 
1. Test Application Criticisms 
The binding commitment test is the most restrictive of the three step 
transaction tests. In cases like Minnesota Tea Co., a stockholders’ 
resolution evidencing a clear plan exists,256 and in Revenue Ruling 2001-
46, an “integrated plan” provides for both steps.257 The test requires that 
“if one transaction is to be characterized as a first step, there [is] a binding 
commitment to take the later steps.”258 The binding commitment test has 
been criticized as being too narrow in scope, failing to recharacterize too 
many multi-step transactions concocted for tax evasion as a single 
transaction.259 One court noted that “the step transaction doctrine would 
be a dead letter if restricted to situations where the parties were bound to 
take certain steps.”260 One commentator stated that a binding commitment 
sufficiently justifies an application of the step transaction doctrine, but this 
commentator also indicates that broad agreement exists that it should not 
be the only test.261 Another commentator has argued that, other than in the 
case in which it was originally applied, the binding commitment test 
mostly has been explained away and not applied by succeeding courts.262 
Finally, and most problematically, other commentators have provided that 
the binding commitment test is limited sometimes to situations in which the 
taxpayer is attempting to use the step transaction doctrine offensively.263 In 
other words, in the view of some courts and scholars, the IRS is permitted 
to assert the step transaction doctrine to recharacterize a transaction on the 
basis of any test, but if the taxpayer wants to assert the step transaction 
doctrine to characterize a series of steps it took as a single transaction, 
                                                                                                             
 254. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 26. 
 255. See Bowen, supra note 253, at 723−27. 
 256. Minn. Tea Co. v. Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 611 (1938). 
 257. Rev. Rul. 2001-46, 2001-2 C.B. 321. 
 258. McDonald’s Rests., Inc. v. Comm’r, 688 F.2d 520, 525 (7th Cir. 1982) 
(quoting Redding v. Comm’r, 630 F.2d 1169, 1178 (7th Cir. 1980)). 
 259. See supra notes 248–252 and accompanying text. 
 260. King Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 518 (Ct. Cl. 1969) 
(emphasis added). 
 261. Bowen, supra note 253, at 723. 
 262. Rosenberg, supra note 26, at 406. 
 263. See BORIS I. BITTKER & JAMES S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ¶ 12.61[3] (7th ed. 2000 & Supp. 2015-02). 




ostensibly the taxpayer only may use the binding commitment test as the 
basis for its assertion.264 
The interdependence test is less restrictive than the binding commitment 
test, casting a wider net. At least one critic, however, has noted that the 
interdependence test, at times, integrates steps that ought to be separate and 
separates steps that ought to be integrated.265 Another critic has proposed an 
alternative test that includes an economic significance limitation to the 
interdependence test.266 This limitation would require that separate steps 
should not be stepped together under the interdependence test if they have 
independent economic significance.267 That critic argues that steps should 
be combined only when steps must follow each other either based on a 
binding commitment or economic compulsion.268 Otherwise, the steps 
should not be combined.269 
Many commentators have examined and criticized the end result test.270 
One of the most common criticisms is that it is open-ended and does not 
provide clear guidance for when two steps should be combined and when 
they are to be separated.271 
King Enterprises Inc. v. United States272 is among the most commonly 
cited and criticized cases that applied a robust version of the end result 
test.273 In particular, in Revenue Ruling 2001-46, the IRS cited King 
Enterprises for the proposition that the step transaction doctrine should be 
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applied in the merger context in which the first step is a stock acquisition 
followed by a second step: a merger.274  
 King Enterprises is relevant to the concern that the end result test is 
too open-ended, as discussed above, because of the offensive use275 of the 
step transaction doctrine by the taxpayer in that case.276 The King 
Enterprises decision subsequently was cited by two IRS revenue rulings, 
prompting a critical response from commentators.277 Critics argued that 
“the tax consequences to one party to a transaction should not be changed 
by a subsequent unilateral act of another party when the first party neither 
knew, nor should have known, that the later act would occur.”278 Critics 
noted that the court simply inferred that the tax benefits of tax-free 
reorganization treatment must have been intended from the outset because 
they were significant, even though no evidence existed to show that the 
taxpayer knew about MM’s future plans.279 Critics highlighted that the key 
to application of the end result test must be the intent of the parties; at least 
the affected party, and probably both parties, must intend the end result.280 
The danger in applying the end result test without the intent of both parties 
is the possibility that the government could assert the end result test against 
a taxpayer when there is no “factual connection between the steps” and the 
taxpayer simply is a passive party with respect to the future steps.281 
Another danger is a whipsawing of the IRS, which actually happened in 
the King Enterprises transaction.282 MM achieved a stepped up basis 
because it successfully treated the transaction as a taxable stock purchase, 
and the taxpayer achieved tax-deferred treatment from the receipt of MM 
stock.283 
Other commentators have defended King Enterprises on the grounds 
that principles can be derived from it that do not result in whipsawing of 
the IRS.284 One commentator suggested three principles for application of 
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the doctrine when a future unilateral act is included in the completed 
transaction’s tax treatment:  
(1) the fact that another unrelated party to the transaction did have 
such a plan (that is, the subsequent step was not a total 
afterthought), (2) the assumption that a reasonable application of 
the step transaction doctrine could require the knowledgeable 
party to report according to the substance of the transaction, and 
(3) the policy asserted here that once the transaction is 
recharacterized as to the knowing party all other parties should be 
required to report it according to that characterization, whether or 
not they had advance knowledge of the planned step.285 
One commentator, Karen B. Brown, has argued that the courts have been 
inappropriately hesitant to apply the step transaction doctrine when the 
taxpayer has been able to demonstrate a business purpose.286 Brown argues 
that courts should focus on statutory intent instead.287 According to Brown, 
when a transaction is within the taxpayer’s control and the result of the 
transaction subverts statutory intent, a court should apply the step transaction 
doctrine.288 
2. Criticism of the Existence of Specific Tests 
One critic of the end result test, Stephen S. Bowen, has suggested that 
the interdependence test and the binding commitment test should be the 
only tests and that the interdependence test should be based on economic 
compulsion.289 Thus, Bowen no longer would permit the use of the end 
result test.290 Bowen argues that steps should “not be regarded as mutually 
interdependent if they have independent economic significance, based on 
the economic significance and equal step limitations.”291 Bowen lists one 
piece of additional evidence of economic effect: parting with the traditional 
benefits and burdens of stock ownership is sufficient evidence for the 
independence of a step.292 Bowen argues that to avoid the open-ended 
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nature of the end result test, the concept of economic compulsion must be 
narrow.293 He gives as examples “actual or threatened lawsuits and 
foreclosures and various rights and obligations set forth in unrelated or 
collateral agreements.”294 Bowen specifically excludes market forces and 
likely or potential income tax consequences.295 He also excludes situations 
in which a substantial possibility exists that taking the second step would 
be impossible after taking the first step.296  
Under Bowen’s theory, steps are independent if they meet the 
economic significance limitation and the equal-step limitation.297 Both of 
these limitations, Bowen notes, derive from court rulings limiting the 
application of the end result test.298  
The economic significance limitation provides that two transactions 
are not stepped together if the “‘economic motivation’ of each was 
‘sufficiently meaningful’ on its own account and ‘was not dependent upon 
the other transaction for its substantiation.’”299 As an example, Bowen 
provides a modified version of the situation in Revenue Ruling 75-406 in 
which a target owns a subsidiary and it spins off that subsidiary by 
distributing stock of the subsidiary to shareholders of the target.300 The 
distribution was required by a government divestiture order.301 The 
shareholders of the target, now shareholders of the subsidiary, voted for 
the subsidiary to merge into the acquiring corporation.302 The IRS ruled 
that the continuity of interest requirement for spin-offs was satisfied, 
despite the merger following immediately after the spin-off, because the 
new shareholders of the subsidiary could have voted against the merger.303 
The equal-step limitation provides that taxpayers are free to choose 
between two different routes to achieving the same end if each involves 
the same number of steps.304 Bowen illustrates this limitation with a 
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discussion of Revenue Ruling 75-161.305 In that ruling, a parent company 
had two wholly owned subsidiaries, X and Y.306 The liabilities of X 
exceeded X’s basis in its assets.307 The liabilities of Y did not exceed its 
basis in its assets.308 The transaction could have been structured as a 
merger in either direction, but the parent structured it so that X merged 
into Y.309 The IRS respected the transaction and noted that, pursuant to § 
357(c), Y would not have recognized gain if X had been the acquirer rather 
than the target.310  
The problem, however, with focusing on economic compulsion is that 
some events are interdependent but not economically compelled. The best 
example of this is McDonald’s Restaurants of Illinois v. Commissioner.311 
In McDonald’s Restaurants of Illinois,312 the owners of independent 
franchises wanted to receive cash for their ownership, but the purchasing 
company, the franchisor, needed to use stock for accounting reasons.313 
Therefore, McDonald’s used a two-step process to acquire the independent 
franchises. The target shareholders were given unregistered stock and 
registration rights as well as the right to force registration but were not 
compelled to register and then sell the stock.314 Almost all of them 
registered and sold the stock, however.315 The court thus stepped together 
the two transactions.316 Forcing reorganization treatment in cases like this 
could result in taxpayers selling loss corporations and claiming losses 
while the corporate acquirers report a higher carryover basis and claim the 
resulting higher depreciation, making it easier to sell loss corporations.317 
Furthermore, an interdependence test based on economic compulsion 
is too narrow and does not properly account for some transactions that 
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clearly should be stepped together. Such transactions include two-step 
mergers in which the second step is intended but contingent on some 
external event, such as board or shareholder approval. The first step is still 
economically desirable, even if not preferable, when isolated from the 
second step. 
3. Critics Favoring an Entirely New Test 
One commentator, Joshua D. Rosenberg, argues that none of these 
tests will be sufficient because they lack a reasoned conceptual basis.318 In 
his work, Rosenberg presents a broad critique of the judicial doctrines that 
are used to recharacterize transactions or to find tax avoidance in a 
transaction that satisfies statutory requirements but otherwise is found 
lacking.319 Specifically, Rosenberg criticizes the step transaction doctrine on 
several grounds, including the following principles: (1) three tests exist but 
there is no clear guidance as to when each test should be applied; (2) the 
doctrine bases its determination of “what was done” on more than legal 
rights—something that courts are not competent to determine; and (3) intent 
or purpose often is applied to only one party and then extrapolated to 
determine the mutual intent of both parties.320 Rosenberg suggests a new 
definition for all problems related to tax avoidance. Rosenberg defines tax 
avoidance as existing “only when there is a convergence of undermeasurement 
of economic income with a failure to achieve the specific goals underlying the 
provision that allows for that undermeasurement.”321 
Rosenberg argues that courts should bifurcate their determinations in tax 
avoidance cases into two parts: “(1) What is the transaction that has occurred? 
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and (2) To what extent has the taxpayer engaged in tax avoidance?”322 For 
step one, Rosenberg argues that state contract law should govern the 
determination of the relationship of the parties and the facts of a case.323 
Rosenberg asserts that separate exchanges should be integrated only if 
they “form an integrated contract under basic principles of contract 
law.”324 Rosenberg cites an old Board of Tax Appeals case discussing the 
basic principle of contract integration and argues that if a party can enforce 
one part of an agreement based on consideration provided in another part, 
then an integrated contract exists and the exchanges ought to be stepped 
together.325 Rosenberg argues that basing integration on state contract law 
will be more predictable than the end result test or the other step 
transaction tests.326 He also asserts that relying on state contract law for 
guidance does not restrict the inquiry to the four corners of the contract 
because that contract may be found to depend on another contract and 
parol evidence might be admitted to show that the four corners of the 
contract do not express the intent of the parties.327 
Rosenberg’s first step—determining the transaction by relying only on 
legal obligations as would be determined in an ordinary contract case—
does not give courts sufficient flexibility to delineate the boundaries 
between multiple transactions, especially when some of those transactions 
are governed by formal documents and others by informal arrangements 
and expectations of reciprocation. An example of a case in which informal 
agreements and expectations or reciprocation play a substantial role is a 
modified version of the factual scenario in King Enterprises.328 Shareholders 
of a company may exchange all of their stock with another company for 
various types of consideration, including consideration that is primarily 
stock of the other company.329 The stock may be enough that if a formal 
merger were effected, the transaction would qualify as an A reorganization 
and meet all of the non-statutory requirements, such as continuity of interest 
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and continuity of business enterprise.330 The merger, however, may take 
place shortly thereafter and be a part of a separate instrument.  
In fact, the Treasury Department promulgated anti-abuse provisions in 
the Treasury Regulations, knowing that many intended events are not 
recorded in the same instrument but are done shortly after each other, 
maybe even to avoid adverse tax consequences.331 Therefore, the Treasury 
Regulations provide all sorts of anti-abuse rules that create presumptions 
that certain events are part of the same plan if they take place within a 
stated timeframe.332 These rules acknowledge that informal agreements 
and undocumented intentions are a significant part of economic reality. A 
judicial test that is supposed to connect events that are connected 
economically should be flexible enough to account for informal 
agreements and undocumented intentions.  
Most significantly, related-party transactions, such as those in True, 
often involve parties who do not need to document their intentions because 
they are not worried about other parties’ actions.333 The Trues knew that 
no one would interfere with True Ranches ultimately owning the ranch 
parcels and with Smokey Oil Company ultimately owning the oil and gas 
leases.334  
In step two of his proposal, Rosenberg classifies all tax avoidance 
problems as either “substituted reference” problems or “gross measurement” 
problems.335 Rosenberg defines substituted reference problems as situations 
in which Congress has to substitute some status or behavior when economic 
income becomes too difficult to measure.336 As an example of substituted 
referents, Rosenberg provides that comparing business motives of the 
taxpayer to personal motives of the taxpayer could help determine whether 
an expense is deductible.  Rosenberg argues that this would be better than 
the economic income test, which would ask whether there was 
consumption corresponding to the amount of an investment.337  
With regard to substitute reference problems, Rosenberg suggests 
focusing on motive to determine whether the mismeasurement was 
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intentional or merely coincidental.338 Rosenberg admits that the proof of 
intentionality will look similar to the proof currently offered in step 
transaction cases.339 He argues, however, that the proof will be more 
accurate because it will focus on motives rather than on a factual 
determination.340 He argues that under his proposal step transactions 
would become “strong evidence of tax avoidance” rather than “themselves 
the tax avoidance.”341 Rosenberg argues that a strength of his approach is 
that his approach does not rely on claiming “what happened did not 
happen.”342 Instead, his approach relies on examining whether the 
transactions were motivated, fully or partially, by tax avoidance, with the 
result being a “full or partial withdrawal of the tax benefit that would 
otherwise be improperly granted.”343 Rosenberg admits that allowing a 
finding of partial tax avoidance will result in more predictability regarding 
the result of litigation and less predictability regarding when the IRS 
would bring a case.344  
The weakness of Rosenberg’s argument, however, is that he 
underestimates the extent to which potential nit-picking could create 
unpredictability in the outcome of application of his proposal to real cases. 
Therefore, it will be no easier to determine motive—the same indirect 
proof still will be required—and courts and the IRS will be empowered 
now to determine that a partial tax avoidance motive existed. Such a 
determination allows many more taxpayers to be subject to audit and 
redetermination of the amount of tax due by the IRS and the courts.345 
Although this unpredictability may serve a deterrent purpose, as 
Rosenberg argues, the vagueness of any proof of motive creates danger for 
taxpayers who engage in transactions that, under the current system, are 
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beyond reproach.346 This change would greatly undermine the predictability 
of the outcome of application of the step transaction doctrine. 
Rosenberg’s suggested solution would require a radical rewriting of 
current tax laws, regulations, IRS procedures, and court decisions while 
yielding limited benefits of consistent administration and theoretical 
coherence. Accuracy of measurement and predictability would not be 
enhanced greatly—as even Rosenberg admits.347 
D. Recent Scholarship 
Recent scholarship in the area of anti-abuse doctrines generally has 
focused on the divergence between the articulation of doctrine and its 
application as well as the benefits and drawbacks of the use of either 
standards or rules in articulating anti-abuse doctrines. Professors Joshua 
Blank and Nancy Staudt analyzed every Supreme Court case alleging the 
presence of a corporate tax sham since 1909.348 The study aimed to identify 
the controlling factors that convince judges that corporate tax behavior 
“crosses the line from legal acceptability to abusive activity.”349 Blank and 
Staudt found that courts follow predictable patterns and do not focus on 
business purpose in the way that scholars and policymakers typically 
suppose.350 Rather, they found five factors that controlled the majority of 
decisions: 
We found that when government lawyers seek to convince the 
Court to invoke an anti-abuse doctrine, they routinely point to a 
small collection of very specific facts and circumstances. Three of 
the factors are tied to the nature of the transaction itself and two 
are linked to the position taken by the corporation on its tax return 
filed with the IRS. These five factors are: (1) the presence of third 
parties in the transaction; (2) multistep transactions; (3) the lack 
of a business purpose other than tax avoidance; (4) accounting 
irregularities, such as book-tax differences; and (5) a claim for a 
tax refund on the initial return. We found . . . that the government 
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cited to at least one of these factors in 81% of all corporate tax 
abuse controversies litigated in Court.351  
One recent article draws a distinction between rules that state their 
underlying principle of application accurately and rules that “prescribe[] 
an outcome for a set of anticipated factual situations by applying, but not 
stating directly, the underlying principle.”352 Prescriptive rules, this 
scholar posits, can be more complex, more challenging to administer, and 
more expensive for corporate compliance than principle-based rules.353 
The relative benefit of principle-based rules in corporate tax law depends, 
in part, on the level of complexity employed by the enforcers of the 
rules.354 In high complexity settings, prescriptive rules leave gaps in the 
tax code that can be exploited.355 Principle-based rules, such as the step 
transaction doctrine, undermine the certainty offered to legitimate and 
abusive actors alike by prescriptive rules but close the gaps and combat 
abuse.356 Principle-based rules could make tax law less complicated and 
more effective at the cost of increasing uncertainty.357  
II. A NEW VISION OF THE STEP TRANSACTION DOCTRINE 
This Article proposes that the step transaction doctrine should be 
redefined by courts to consist of an objective test and an economic reality test. 
This redefined conception should replace the current binding commitment 
test, interdependence test, and end result test. The new definition gives greater 
clarity to the tests and makes outcomes more predictable.  
One of the main problems of the current set of tests is that they are poorly 
defined.358 In particular, the end result test has been the subject of much 
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criticism because it is so malleable.359 Courts have looked to the intent of 
the taxpayer and analyzed whether the taxpayer intended from the outset 
to take the second or successive steps when the taxpayer took the first 
step.360 Because a view inside the mind of the taxpayer is impossible to 
                                                                                                             
Regulations, 54 SMU L. REV. 159, 160 (2001) (calling the step transaction 
doctrine “ubiquitous if obscure”); Anthony B. Casarona, Comment, Regulating 
Corporate Tax Shelters: Seeking Certainty in a Complex World, 50 CATHOLIC 
UNIV. L. REV. 111, 130−31 (2000) (“As currently applied, the law governing 
corporate tax shelters is a patchwork of ambiguous statutory authority, which is 
sometimes arbitrarily applied to the detriment of legitimate business transactions. 
. . . The rules promulgated to counter corporate tax shelters are inadequate because 
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abuses.”); see also Falconwood Corp. v. United States, 422 F.3d 1339, 1350 (Fed. 
Cir. 2005) (“[V]arious expressions of the step transaction doctrine may have 
different meanings in different contexts” (citing King Enters., Inc. v. United 
States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 (Ct. Cl. 1969))).  
 359. Discussing the end result test as the farthest-reaching test on the 
continuum from binding commitment to interdependence to end result, the Tax 
Court stated,  
The end result test is based upon the actual intent of the parties as of the 
time of the [transaction in question]. It can be argued that any test which 
requires a court to make a factual determination as to a party’s intent 
promotes uncertainty and therefore impedes effective tax planning . . . . 
[T]he end result test is flexible and bases tax consequences on the real 
substance of the transactions, not on the formalisms chosen by the 
participants. 
Penrod v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1415, 1430 (1987); see also Philip Sancilio, 
Clarifying (or Is It Codifying) the Notably Abstruse: Step Transactions, Economic 
Substance, and the Tax Code, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 138, 153 n.72 (2013) (noting 
the courts’ preference for the end result test because of its “breadth and conceptual 
flexibility”); Calvin H. Johnson, A Full and Faithful Marriage: The Substantially-
All-the-Properties Requirement in a Corporate Reorganization, 50 TAX LAW. 
319, 348 (1997) (discussing the end result, the author states that “[s]ubjective tests 
have a history of manipulation.”). A problem with this test, according to 
Rosenberg, is that “while it provides a ready means to support an allegation that 
two legally independent exchanges are actually parts of a single, integrated 
transaction, it provides almost no basis whatsoever to support an allegation that 
two actions are ever separate.” Rosenberg, supra note 26, at 407. Because the end 
result test will join two separate exchanges together if “at the time the first is 
engaged in, the taxpayer also intends to engage in the second, this test could treat as 
a ‘transaction’ every single exchange intended by a taxpayer at the time he engages 
in any other, seemingly unrelated, exchange.” Rosenberg, supra note 26, at 407. 
 360. “Application of [the end result test] requires examination of the actual 
intent of the taxpayer, regardless of the purported form of chosen transactions.” 
Allen D. Madison, The Tension between Textualism and Substance-over-Form 




obtain, external factors have to be examined.361 Defining a test one way 
and then actually implementing it another way, however, creates problems 
of fairness, notice, and certainty. Furthermore, at times the courts have 
confused the tests.362 For example, the court in McDonald’s defined the 
binding commitment test such that it was almost indistinguishable from 
the interdependence test.363  
The proposed tests thus would vindicate several tax policy objectives. 
They would be more predictable than the current tests because they would 
be objective rather than subjective.364 The proposed tests would rely on a 
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test, the taxpayer’s own characterization of the transaction may be the 
only evidence that is available. Where millions of dollars of tax are at 
stake, moreover, a taxpayer “intent,” even within the mind, can be quite 
plastic. 
Johnson, supra note 359, at 347 (footnote omitted). 
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reasonable third party’s understanding of a transaction or the behavior of 
a hypothetical reasonable business rather than an attempt to ascertain 
subjective intent.365 Thus, they also would promote greater certainty. The 
proposed tests still would protect the public treasury sufficiently, however, 
because, in at least some cases, taxpayers have been able to use offensively 
the existing, more malleable tests to their own benefit.366 Although this 
Article advocates acknowledging and accepting limited offensive use, the 
tighter and more objective tests will make that use rarer. Also, by drawing 
on ideas from other areas of law, the test will dovetail with parties’ 
expectations regarding the consequences of a transaction.  
A. Objective Test 
For arms-length transactions, the objective test this Article proposes 
would ask whether the parties’ actions, as demonstrated by documentary 
evidence or other admissible evidence regarding contractual obligations, 
manifested a mutual intention that a series of transactions should be 
combined into a single transaction. As with the objective test from contract 
law, the trier of fact would look to the ordinary meaning of terms in 
documents and the understanding of actions that a reasonable person in the 
position of the other party would have.367 An objective test borrowed from 
contract law may draw upon preexisting cases for setting the contours of the 
standard.368 The simple example would be when the parties consummated 
one transaction followed immediately by a second transaction, and the 
contract for the second transaction clearly presupposed a state of affairs that 
would exist only after the first transaction or, even more blatantly, referred 
to terms and events from the contract for the first transaction.  
The objective test proposed above, like the mutual interdependence 
test, is a reasonable person test. Unlike the mutual interdependence test, 
                                                                                                             
[U]nder [the step transaction] doctrine, . . . prediction is difficult to the 
point of impossibility. The success of the tax saving enterprise is 
measured by the intention of the taxpayer—whether he intended one 
transaction or separate transactions—and the intention must be 
ascertained from objective evidence. Since the objective evidence (facts) 
in each case will be different, and no patterns appear to be emerging 
under the doctrine, its significance appears dubious. 
Id.  
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however, it does not require speculation regarding hypotheticals; rather, it 
relies upon whether the parties manifested intentions that could be understood 
by a reasonable third-party observer. The mutual interdependence test asks 
whether a reasonable person would enter into transactions, which requires 
thinking about a reasonable business or businessperson and guessing what 
they would do.369 Judges and juries do not have the expertise necessarily to 
speculate regarding the behavior of a reasonable businessperson. The 
objective test this Article proposes only asks courts to assess whether 
parties’ own actions manifested an intent to take certain future steps—
whether or not those future steps were a good idea. The proposed test also 
is not limited to whether the parties foreclosed other options. It simply asks 
whether the parties’ actions manifested a mutual intent to combine two 
steps. 
Contract law adopted the objective test because it protects the 
reasonable expectations of the parties by relying on the ordinary meaning 
of words and actions.370 This facilitates reliance on promises because one 
party does not have to know the intent of another party but only has to look 
to the ordinary meaning of the words and actions of the other party.371 
Thus, unless one has reason to know that the other party does not intend 
to be bound by a contract, the signing of the contract creates binding 
obligations even in the case in which the other party does not intend to be 
bound, has not read the contract, or does not understand the legal 
consequences.372 This reliance on ordinary meaning facilitates business 
transactions and the smooth operation of the marketplace by creating 
predictable consequences for commonplace activities.373 
In the example from the Introduction involving George and Isabella, 
if George and Isabella were unrelated, the objective test would ask whether 
they, through references in contracts prior to the contribution, or through 
other dealings or actions prior to the contribution, manifested an intent to 
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complete the sale of George’s stock immediately after George’s contribution 
of property to Newco. 
The proposed test differs from Rosenberg’s application of state 
contract law in this area in one significant way. The proposed test asks 
whether a third party would understand objectively that two transactions 
are dependent on each other even if the documents do not obligate one 
transaction to be performed after the other and one document does not rely 
on terms from another document. Here, concepts from commercial law 
may be useful. Using concepts similar to courses of performance, dealing, 
and trade may influence an understanding that two transactions were 
dependent on each other. For example, if two parties historically have 
engaged in a certain type of transaction followed by another type, and the 
same pattern occurs here, the two transactions properly may be stepped 
together. Concepts like course of dealing, trade, and performance may be 
more important for the proposed test than in the interpretation of 
obligations under a contract when the literal language contradicts 
inferences drawn from course of performance, dealing, or trade.  
The interdependence test and the binding commitment test are the 
currently existing tests that both, in some sense, are objective. These two 
tests have weaknesses, however. First, the binding commitment test rarely 
is used and is easily manipulated.374 Taxpayers need only to avoid 
obligating themselves in writing to take later steps.375 The interdependence 
test is objective in the sense that it asks whether a reasonable person would 
see the steps as so interdependent that they cannot be separated.376 This 
test is even more disconnected from any conception of the contract than 
the end result test. The interdependence test does not look to whether the 
parties indicated in their agreement whether the steps are connected but 
asks a third person to determine whether the steps appear to that third 
person to be so interdependent as to be inseparable.377 Objective standards 
have many benefits that help the standards prevail in contract law and other 
areas. Objective standards limit evidentiary concerns, as state of mind is 
hard to determine, encourage reliance, and encourage economically 
beneficial transactions.378 
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Besides the benefits applicable to objective standards generally, 
applying an objective test in the step transaction doctrine advances a number 
of general tax policy concerns. An objective test promotes predictability and 
certainty because the test works through the lens of a third party.379 
Taxpayers do not need to be concerned about a judge or jury construing their 
intentions—something that taxpayers have to worry about under the end 
result test or even the interdependence test.380 Furthermore, borrowing 
concepts from contract law also promotes predictability because a 
preexisting body of caselaw can be drawn upon to see how the relationship 
between two transactions might be construed based upon concepts such as 
course of performance and course of dealing.381 
On the other hand, the objective test is more flexible than the current 
binding commitment test. There is broad agreement that limiting the step 
transaction doctrine to the binding commitment test would almost defeat 
the purpose of the step transaction doctrine.382 Thus, the objective test 
strikes a balance between predictability and flexibility. 
Some individuals may criticize the proposed objective test by arguing 
that sometimes only one party cares about the tax consequences of the 
transaction; the other party is a so-called tax indifferent party.383 In such 
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cases, often one of the parties is not a taxpayer because of net operating 
losses or because the tax would be imposed upon shareholders and the 
majority of those shareholders are not taxpayers themselves—institutional 
investors such as pension funds, for example, which are not taxed.384 Thus, 
a deal could be negotiated to place the tax consequences on the party who 
pays little or no tax, making the public treasury the only party that suffers. 
To foreclose this possibility, courts should create an additional safeguard: 
if the government can show that the combined steps would result overall 
in a significantly greater amount of income pre-tax for one party and at 
least as much—or nearly as much—income pre-tax for the other party or 
parties, and the government can show that the primary purpose of the 
structure was to reduce or avoid income tax, then the economic reality test 
will be applied in place of the objective test.385 If the tax consequences will 
occur only in the future, for example, upon a future sale of property, then 
the court should assume that the party subject to those consequences will 
have a tax imposed unless that is impossible, for example, if the party is 
not a taxpayer, or highly improbable, for example, if the party has an 
enormous carry forward available for a long period of time that will offset 
any applicable gain. Although this second requirement adds a subjective 
element to an otherwise objective test, the requirement is necessary to 
prevent the objective test from becoming hollow.386 Objective tests always 
are open to the possibility of manipulation by wily taxpayers.387 If one 
                                                                                                             
 384. See id.  
 385. Philip J. Levine & Britt M. Haxton, “The End Result Test” Revisited, 
Part 1, 149 TAX NOTES 1259, 1260–61 (2015). For a description of the economic 
reality test, see infra notes 387–421 and accompanying text. 
 386. RANDOPH E. PAUL, SELECTED STUDIES IN FEDERAL TAXATION 300 
(1938) (“The desirability of subjective motive . . . as a test of tax liability revolves 
around the essential antimony of all tax law,—the desire for certainty on the one 
hand, and on the other, the twin needs of providing exemptions for transactions 
which—because of business or other reasons—deserve exemption, and of 
preventing loss of revenue through avoidance devices.”). 
 387. See Montgomery B. Angell, Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance, 38 COLUM. 
L. REV. 80, 83 (1938) (“[A]side from [some] . . . exceptions, the substantive 
provisions of our revenue statutes are drawn so that a tax is imposed depending 
upon the existence or non-existence of objective facts, and the existence or non-
existence of an intent to escape the tax plays no part in the determination of the 
tax liability.”); Stephen J. McGarry, State of Mind Standards in Taxation, 7 AM. 
J. TAX POL’Y 249, 252 (1988) (“The goal of tax standards is to both determine the 
what, where, when, and how income is to be to be taxed and to encourage or 
discourage particular activities by taxpayers. Although the objective standards 
appear at first to be merely a method of measuring income or deductions, the 
ability of taxpayers to use the rules to their advantage soon raises the question 




taxpayer is tax indifferent, it is easier to structure the objective elements 
of a transaction so that they mask the actual intent of the transaction. If 
both taxpayers will be subject to tax consequences, then the bargain that 
they strike should be respected in accordance with the normal rule that 
courts respect the agreements of parties negotiating at arms-length.388 The 
safeguard provided by the government’s ability to prove tax indifference 
raises the question of whether there should be only one test: an economic 
reality test.  
B. Economic Reality Test 
For related-party transactions, the economic reality test, drawing on 
the articulation of the interdependence test in True v. United States, would 
ask whether each step has a “reasoned economic justification standing 
alone.” 389 As with the economic reality test in differentiating a true lease 
from a financing interest,390 the trier of fact would focus not on the intent 
of the parties but on whether unrelated parties facing similar economic and 
business constraints would construct the transaction with a similar series 
of steps. 
The test for related parties must, by necessity, be different than the test 
for unrelated parties. Related parties do not have to write out their 
contracts but can rely on unwritten understandings.391 Furthermore, there 
may be no previous course of performance, dealing, or trade to look to in 
order to understand which transactions typically have followed one another. 
Having a non-tax business purpose or having economic effects, as measured 
by “actual payment of money, legal transfer of property, adjustment of 
company books, and execution of a contract,” however, independently are 
not sufficient to deem a step as having economic justification.392 
The economic reality test would determine reasoned economic 
justification by looking to the behavior exhibited by businesses engaged in 
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similar arms-length transactions.393 If businesses engaged in arms-length 
transactions would never engage in the intermediate, challenged steps, the 
steps probably do not have reasoned economic justification. A taxpayer 
could overcome this presumption by showing substantial economic effects 
on all related parties involved—especially effects that influenced dealings 
with unrelated third parties. If the only advantage to one of the parties came 
from tax savings, the tax savings would not be sufficient to show reasoned 
economic justification. A taxpayer could overcome this presumption by 
showing a significant lapse in time, during which the various related parties 
continued to conduct their businesses before taking the asserted last step of 
the purported multi-step, integrated transaction. Although this is similar to 
the hypothetical reasonable person, it is necessary to have this hypothetical 
in related-party transactions. It simply is too easy for related parties to 
create paper entities and paper cashflows that do not change the economics 
of a transaction.394 
The idea here for an economic reality test is borrowed from Uniform 
Commercial Code (“UCC”) § 1-203. The section begins by acknowledging 
that the determination is based on the “facts of each case.”395 The section 
goes on to list a number of factors that would transform something that was 
in the “form of a lease” into something that in substance is for a financing 
transaction.396 These factors focus on whether the supposed lessor has a 
residual economic interest in the property.397 In other words, whether the 
supposed lessor has a residual economic interest depends on whether the 
lessor is expected to derive further economic benefit from the property 
after the date on which the property is expected to return to the lessor’s 
full control.398 
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The official comment to UCC § 1-203 emphasizes “greater certainty 
in commercial transactions” as a reason for adopting a “sharper line 
between leases and security interests disguised as leases.”399 The comment 
continues by noting that the “[r]eference to the intent of the parties . . . led 
to unfortunate results.”400 Thus, the drafters removed references to intent 
in the UCC and moved to a series of tests that “focus on economics.”401 
This focus on economics was intended to avoid a focus on the surrounding 
circumstances of the deal and instead focus on whether the purported 
lessee has the right to own the goods for their remaining economic life.402 
The previous focus on intent and surrounding circumstances had led courts 
to render decisions on the basis of criteria that could apply just as easily to 
true leases as to security interests.403 A series of factors described as a 
“bright-line test” indicate the creation of a security interest; if those factors 
are not met, courts look to all of the facts and circumstances to determine 
whether the parties created a lease or a security interest.404 One of the 
reasons for the focus on economics is that in some circumstances, only one 
of the parties—usually the purported lessee—cares about the structure of the 
transaction.405 Tax or other reasons might favor a lease characterization.406 
Thus, a focus on economics eliminates the need for a roving exploration of 
intent.407 A focus on economics in the context of related parties and the step 
transaction doctrine is similarly beneficial. 
In the example from the Introduction involving George and Isabella, 
if George and Isabella were related—if they were siblings, for example—
and they had a series of dealings, the court would ask whether reasonable 
business people would structure their transactions in a similar manner. The 
court would look at whether various transactions between the siblings 
changed their economic positions in ways unrelated to tax. The economic 
reality test would require a broader and more rigorous examination than 
the examination required by the objective test if George and Isabella were 
unrelated. The economic reality test would not look simply at George and 
Isabella’s manifested intent regarding the structure of the transaction but 
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whether unrelated parties would structure the transaction in a similar 
manner. 
An economic reality test promotes certainty and predictability better 
than the end result test or the interdependence test.408 Although it requires 
thinking about a reasonable business or businessperson—a disadvantage in 
comparison to the objective test—the economic reality test does not require 
taxpayers to guess how a judge would infer intent from their actions like the 
end result test requires.409 In True and other cases, courts often have 
articulated the end result test in terms of the subjective intent of the 
taxpayer—something that the taxpayer may know but that a court can only 
guess.410 And, in some cases, such as McDonald’s, the court has added a 
subjective element even to the interdependence test or has articulated the 
test in terms other than the economic relationship between the steps.411 
In constructing the hypothetical reasonable businessperson, courts 
could look to other areas of tax law, such as transfer pricing, for inspiration. 
Transfer pricing is a much discussed area of law, especially with the ongoing 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) project of the Organization for 
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Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”).412 Under current 
transfer pricing standards accepted by the OECD and applied by the IRS, 
the gold-standard method for determining the tax consequences of an 
intragroup transaction is to use the comparable uncontrolled price 
method.413 The comparable uncontrolled price method looks to find a 
comparable transaction in the marketplace that involved arms-length 
parties.414 The method then requires an inquiry into how much the arms-
length parties paid for the product.415 The Treasury Regulations describe 
how the comparable uncontrolled price method is applied to a transfer of 
goods.416 The method looks for an arms-length transaction involving, most 
importantly, similar products and also looks at product quality, contractual 
terms, type of market, geography, date, and other factors.417 The analogy 
here would be to ask whether parties undertaking a similar transaction that 
seeks to take advantage of tax-deferral provisions within the Internal 
Revenue Code—or avoid the application of such provisions out of a desire 
for immediate taxation and related basis consequences—are entering into 
the transaction on similar terms and using similar steps as arms-lengths 
parties, in the same position as the original parties, would use. One would 
try to find transactions that had a similar result—tax-free incorporation, 
tax-free division—and were similar in other ways: the size and scope of 
the business of the parties; the industry of the parties; the geographic 
location of the parties; the relative size of the parties in relation to each 
other; and other similar factors. 
An economic reality test would have several benefits in the context of 
related parties and the step transaction doctrine. First, by ignoring the 
parties’ intent, the test ignores the transaction’s form and, therefore, 
prevents manipulation of the law.418 Additionally, the test emphasizes the 
parties’ relative economic positions resulting from the transaction’s 
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substance.419 Consequently, the test places the court’s attention on the 
economic interests of the parties rather than their intent: “[W]hat economic 
value represented by the goods is being transferred from the seller to the 
buyer, or from the lessor to the lessee, or from the debtor to the secured 
party?”420 When a court implements an economic reality test, it proceeds 
through the thought process of an economically rational actor.421 Finally, 
the test is flexible yet concrete, which is important because of the range of 
industries and parties involved as well as the uncertainties affecting 
elements of the test.422  
Although the economic realities test in commercial law differs from 
the uncontrolled price method—a test that is more like the hypothetical 
reasonable person test—the economic realities test in commercial law is 
useful as an analogy for describing the rebuttal to the hypothetical 
reasonable person test. The rebuttal requires testing the economic effects 
of each step, similar to the factors that are examined in the economic 
realities test in commercial law. Thus, if a taxpayer is able to provide 
economic reasoning for each step, a court may find that the transaction 
reflects economic reality even if reasonable business people in similar 
circumstances would not have constructed the transaction in the same 
series of steps. 
An economic reality test protects the public treasury and prevents 
evasion better than an objective test or a binding commitment test. 
Regarding the existing interdependence and end result test, although the 
economic reality test is arguably more difficult for the government to 
meet, it is, in a sense, less capricious for all parties involved. Furthermore, 
the existing tests sometimes have been asserted “offensively” by the 
taxpayer successfully.423 By contrast, the economic reality test is less 
susceptible to guesswork by a judge or jury because the test requires a 
judge or jury to examine the economics of the transactions rather than the 
intentions of the parties. In addition, the test should not be available for 
offensive use by the taxpayer. 
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C. Why Two Tests? 
The overarching reason for having two tests is the fundamental 
difference between unrelated-party transactions and related-party 
transactions. Unrelated-party transactions involve parties who negotiate a 
deal with interests that compete in most areas. Although tax is a part of 
every business deal, tax is not usually the primary motivator.424 Rather, 
business decisions usually are motivated by concerns related to future 
profitability, opportunities to expand to new markets, and many other 
motivations unrelated to reducing tax.425 Even accounting considerations 
often outweigh tax considerations.426 Underlying much of business law is 
a basic respect for the autonomy interest of unrelated parties contracting 
with each other.427 The objective test will protect that autonomy interest 
for unrelated parties. An economic reality test properly balances that 
autonomy interest against concerns regarding the ability of related parties 
to manipulate generally applicable laws and thus evade tax. 
An objective test also promotes the predictable administration of the 
tax law. Taxpayers could be less concerned that an individual judge will 
examine the economics of the transaction and redefine the relationship of 
the parties. Although some loss to the public treasury exists with an 
objective test, the loss likely will be small and the greater predictability 
likely outweighs the loss. Greater predictability promotes business 
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transactions that grow the economy, creating more income and thus 
ultimately generating additional tax.428  
An economic reality test is more appropriate for related-party 
transactions because an objective test is far too malleable.429 Furthermore, 
the economic reality test is less malleable than the current interdependence 
and end result tests because it looks to economics rather than intent, which 
makes the test less subjective, thus promoting predictable outcomes.430 
D. Offensive Use of Judicial Doctrines 
This Article argues that taxpayers who are not related parties should 
be able to use the step transaction doctrine “offensively” when there is a 
manifested mutual intent to combine steps into a completed transaction, 
absent unanticipated intervening events. There are three reasons supporting 
the argument to permit the “offensive” use of the step transaction doctrine: 
(1) permitting “offensive” use conforms better with the reasoning for having 
a step transaction test separate and apart from the other pervasive judicial 
doctrines; (2) permitting “offensive” use is supported, to some degree, by 
actual court practice;431 and (3) in recent years, the IRS even has conceded 
to limited offensive use of the doctrine by taxpayers.432  
The IRS and the courts have been hesitant to allow taxpayers to use 
judicial doctrines offensively—that is, to characterize their transactions as 
having a substance different from their form.433 The courts have 
formulated this hesitancy to permit taxpayers to disavow the form of their 
transaction with two different rules: (1) the Danielson rule;434 and (2) the 
strong proof rule.435 The Danielson rule, the more restrictive and less 
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widely adopted of the two, only permits taxpayers to disavow their form 
if they can prove certain contractual defenses, such as fraud or mutual 
mistake.436 The strong proof rule, as the name suggests, only permits such 
disavowal if the taxpayer provides strong proof that the form does not 
reflect the substance of the transaction.437 In the context of the step 
transaction doctrine, the analogy would be permitting only taxpayers to 
use the binding commitment test when offensively asserting the step 
transaction doctrine. Some courts and the IRS apparently accept this 
analogy and have adopted this approach.438 
In the context of the application of the step transaction doctrine, 
however, the analogy to Danielson and the strong proof rule does not hold, 
and the courts should permit unrelated taxpayers to use the objective test 
to recharacterize their own transactions.439 In Danielson, a taxpayer has 
selected his form; in step transaction, the taxpayer has selected form, but 
the taxpayer has done so for more than one step and the question is not 
“What is the form—singular—of the transaction?” but “Are two steps a 
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part of one and the same transaction both for form and substance?”440 The 
notions embodied in the strong proof rule and the Danielson rule are 
similar to the notion of contra proferentem in contract law.441 Thus, 
taxpayers draft their own contracts, create their own forms, and should be 
bound to these contracts and forms. Of course, the problem is that in 
merger transactions, for example, the contract is not drafted simply by one 
party; it is drafted by two parties negotiating with each other. In at least 
some cases in mergers and reorganizations, the tax interests of the parties 
align rather than oppose each other.442 The question remains whether the 
step transaction doctrine is similar to substance over form, the main 
context in which Danielson has been applied, a “subset” of it as some 
commentators and courts have said, or whether it is qualitatively different. 
This Article argues that it is qualitatively different. 
In the context of complicated transactions with many steps, when the 
question is determining the place in which one transaction begins and 
another ends, the step transaction doctrine or some other similar doctrine 
must be available to taxpayers, either implicitly in characterizing a series 
of events as one single transaction or multiple separate transactions for 
their returns or explicitly in allowing its use in court. In a world of 
complicated multi-step corporate transactions, it is sometimes hard to say 
where one transaction begins and another ends.443 Often, different 
transactions with different parties will take place in quick succession with 
the intent that a certain economic and business result is achieved for the 
parties.444 Because of very reasonable IRS concerns regarding potential for 
abuse, the IRS officially has sanctioned only the use of the binding 
commitment test in the context of a taxpayer asserting the step transaction 
doctrine to combine two steps into a larger merger.445 
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Just as it can be helpful to look to contract law for defining the types 
of tests, one may look to contract law for the basis for determining whether 
the step transaction doctrine should be available to taxpayers. There is an 
analogy to the doctrine of contra proferentem, however, that used to hold 
sway in tax law. Contra proferentem is the notion that taxing statutes 
should be construed against the government.446 The analogy has long since 
lost favor.447 In a sense, ambiguity should be construed against the 
drafter—the government.448 One scholar has noted that courts have moved 
away from such strict construction based in textualism and moved toward 
construction based on statutory purpose in the interpretation of tax 
statutes.449 Forcing taxpayers to report taxes consistent with the form of a 
transaction rather than its purpose or economic effect, however, holds 
taxpayers to a different standard than the government.  
Another reason for allowing the use of the step transaction doctrine is 
that, empirically, courts have allowed its use offensively.450 A recent 
empirical study found that each of the pervasive judicial doctrines has been 
raised by the taxpayers in recent cases.451 And with all of the doctrines, the 
taxpayer has been successful in at least some of those cases in convincing 
the court to apply the doctrine.452 Furthermore, in the majority of those 
cases, the taxpayer has not been limited by a requirement of showing fraud 
or duress before arguing that she, he, or it could abandon the original form 
of the transaction.453 Therefore, there is a need to reconcile theory with 
practice. At least in the case of the step transaction doctrine, the best way 
for reconciliation to occur is to accommodate some form of offensive use 
of the step transaction doctrine. 
The third reason for allowing offensive use of the step transaction 
doctrine is that the IRS has allowed such offensive use in a recent revenue 
ruling.454 Revenue Ruling 2001-46 discusses two factual situations. The 
first factual situation involves a parent corporation forming a new wholly 
owned subsidiary.455 The parent then acquires all of the stock of a target 
in a statutory merger of the new subsidiary into the target (“Acquisition 
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Merger”). The target shareholders receive as consideration 70% parent 
stock and 30% cash. The target survives and merges into the parent in a 
statutory merger (“Upstream Merger”). The ruling assumes that, absent 
some prohibition, the step transaction doctrine would apply to treat the two 
mergers together as a single, integrated acquisition by the parent of all of the 
assets of the target. The ruling also assumes that the integrated transaction 
would satisfy the nonstatutory requirements for a reorganization. The 
second factual situation is the same as the first except that it assumes that all 
of the consideration in the Acquisition Merger is stock of the parent so that 
the Acquisition Merger viewed alone would qualify as a valid reverse 
subsidiary merger under § 368(a)(2)(E). 
The ruling notes that, under § 338, if a corporation makes a qualified 
stock purchase followed by an election, then the target corporation is 
treated as having sold all of its assets at the close of the acquisition date at 
fair market value and is treated as a new corporation that purchased all of 
its assets as of the beginning of the day after the acquisition.456 A qualified 
stock purchase is defined as the acquisition by one corporation of stock of 
another that results in the acquirer achieving control, defined as holding 
80% of the total voting power and 80% of the total value of stock of the 
target corporation.457 Revenue Ruling 90-95 held that a reverse subsidiary 
merger—in which the consideration was all cash and thus did not qualify 
under § 368(a)(2)(E), followed by a merger of the surviving target into the 
parent—would be treated as a qualified stock purchase followed by a 
liquidation under § 332.458 Revenue Ruling 90-95 reached this holding 
even though the step transaction doctrine is applied properly to disregard 
the existence of the merger subsidiary, which had merged into the target 
in the first step; nonetheless, the acquisition of stock of the target was 
granted independent significance from the subsequent liquidation of 
target. Revenue Ruling 2001-46 notes that Treasury Regulation § 1.338-
3(d) incorporates the approach of Revenue Ruling 90-95 by requiring a 
purchasing corporation to treat certain asset transfers following a qualified 
stock purchase independently of the qualified stock purchase.459 Finally, 
in its discussion of the applicable law, Revenue Ruling 2001-46 notes that 
the much earlier Revenue Ruling 67-274 integrated two steps that would 
have been treated separately as an invalid reorganization under § 
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368(a)(1)(B) followed by a liquidation under § 332.460 The two steps 
integrated instead qualify as a reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(C).461 
At the beginning of its analysis of the two factual situations, Revenue 
Ruling 2001-46 notes that two approaches can determine the tax 
consequences for the two steps in each situation: one approach is to treat 
the steps separately as in Revenue Ruling 90-95, and the other approach is 
to integrate them as in Revenue Ruling 67-274.462 In Situation One, 
treating the steps separately and following Revenue Ruling 90-95 would 
result in the Acquisition Merger being treated as a qualified stock purchase 
and the Upstream Merger being treated as a liquidation under § 332. 
Integrating the steps, following Revenue Ruling 67-274, would result in a 
single statutory reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(A).  
The analysis in Revenue Ruling 2001-46 cited King Enterprises, Inc. 
v. United States,463 a case that predated § 338, in which the court applied 
the step transaction doctrine to treat an acquisition of stock of a target 
corporation followed by the merger of the target corporation into the 
acquiring corporation as an integrated reorganization under § 368(a)(1)(A). 
The ruling then framed the question as whether the approach of Revenue 
Ruling 90-95 applies when the step transaction doctrine otherwise would 
integrate the steps as one valid reorganization under § 368.464 Revenue 
Ruling 2001-46 rejected the application of Treasury Regulation § 1.338-
3(d) and Revenue Ruling 90-95 to this situation by citing the congressional 
intent that § 338 “replace any nonstatutory treatment of a stock purchase 
as an asset purchase under the Kimbell-Diamond doctrine.”465  
The ruling continues by explaining that the policy underlying § 338 is 
not violated because, rather than receiving a cost basis in the assets under 
§ 1012, the acquiring corporation will receive a carryover basis under § 
362.466 Thus, Revenue Ruling 2001-46 concludes that an otherwise invalid 
reverse subsidiary merger without a § 338 election, followed by a forward 
subsidiary merger that would be tax-free if the reverse merger was 
ignored, should be treated as an integrated valid forward subsidiary 
merger.467 For Situation Two, Revenue Ruling 2001-46 holds that the steps 
should be integrated as in Situation One—notwithstanding the fact that the 
                                                                                                             
 460. See Rev. Rul. 67-274, 1967-2 C.B. 141. 
 461. See id. 
 462. See id. 
 463. King Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511 (Ct. Cl. 1969). 
 464. Rev. Rul. 2001-46, 2001-2 C.B. 321. 
 465. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-760, at 536 (1982)). 
 466. Id. 
 467. Id. 




first step would be a valid reorganization if viewed separately from the 
second step.468 
The consequence of this ruling was that parties, through the use of an 
extra step, could consummate a forward subsidiary merger with all of the 
flexibility in consideration provided to forward subsidiary mergers.469  
Further, the parties undertaking the merger could know that if the 
integration of the two steps were not respected, the only tax that would be 
imposed would be at the shareholder level.470 The ruling requires that the 
steps be taken pursuant to a “written agreement that (subject to customary 
conditions) is binding.”471 A further consequence of this ruling was that it 
gave the same treatment of an integrated forward subsidiary merger to a 
two-step merger when the first step, in fact, was a valid reverse subsidiary 
merger. Revenue Ruling 2001-46 was received positively by the tax 
practitioner community.472 
The logic of permitting offensive use of the step transaction doctrine 
in Revenue Ruling 2001-46 makes sense, and the test required for 
offensive use is similar to the one that this Article advocates. Revenue 
Ruling 2001-46 promotes more flexible structuring and removes the 
draconian penalty of two levels of tax when companies are committed to 
a reorganization.473 The ruling thus functions as a recognition by the IRS 
that having the special 80% requirement for forward subsidiary mergers 
should be limited to situations in which such a merger is the only feasible 
route for a combination of the parties’ interests. Under the standard 
advocated by this Article, if parties sign a plan of reorganization that 
contemplates a reverse subsidiary merger followed by a forward subsidiary 
merger but the occurrence of the forward subsidiary merger depends upon 
certain contemplated and anticipated, but not guaranteed, events, then the 
parties may assert the step transaction doctrine offensively.474 Thus, under 
the proposed test, taxpayers may assert offensively the step transaction 
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doctrine if a contractual obligation exists to complete two steps475 or if a 
second step is contemplated and anticipated in a contract and will occur 
absent unanticipated intervening events. 
E. Different Tests, Different Results 
Under the new test, cases involving unrelated parties, such as Heintz 
v. Commissioner,476 would be decided in favor of the government rather 
than the taxpayer.477 Heintz raised the issue of whether the sale was an 
independent event from the merger that immediately followed.478 This 
issue was critical because under the 1939 Code, boot479 in a reorganization 
was taxed at ordinary rates rather than capital gain.480 Therefore, if the 
whole transaction was a reorganization, the boot would be taxed at a higher 
rate than if a sale occurred, followed by a reorganization.481 Although the 
court was correct that the taxpayers intended to sell from the beginning 
and, in fact, only accepted the final deal after attempting to negotiate an 
all cash deal, the court ignored the mutuality involved in characterizing 
the deal as a reorganization.482 All of the documents negotiated by the 
parties contemplated a reorganization that would follow immediately after 
the receipt by taxpayers of cash and stock of the merged corporation.483 In 
fact, taxpayers expressed concerns regarding loss of tax benefits related to 
net operating loss carrybacks, but the acquirer told them that a 
reorganization would compensate them for this loss of benefits.484 
Although courts should acknowledge that the offensive use of the test 
by taxpayers is permitted, ironically, the definition this Article proposes 
would result in a denial of the offensive use of the step transaction doctrine 
and a decision for the government in two of the most famous reported 
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cases, King Enterprises and McDonald’s, in which the taxpayer 
successfully asserted the step transaction doctrine offensively.485  
King Enterprises would be decided in favor of the government 
because there was no mutual expression of intent for a reorganization to 
occur at the time the sale transaction was completed.486 In fact, the court 
acknowledged that the “plan to merge” was “less than announced” even 
as it asserted that it viewed the plan as “more than inchoate.”487 The court 
tacitly acknowledged that the documents and testimony presented at trial 
did not support this conclusion when it stated that “[o]ne gains the 
impression that the record of intentions is edited.”488 The court supported 
this supposition by asserting that it was “difficult to believe that 
sophisticated businessmen arranging a multimillion dollar transaction 
fraught with tax potentials were so innocent of knowledge of the tax 
consequences as the testimony purports.”489 
McDonald’s would be decided in favor of the government because 
although the documents permitted the Garb-Stern group to force a 
registration, a registration never was guaranteed to take place; the Garb-
Stern group could have foregone forcing a registration.490 Although a 
registration right would be enough under the objective test for the 
government to assert the step transaction doctrine, it would not be enough 
for the taxpayer to assert the step transaction doctrine. The taxpayer would 
have to show that there was a contractual obligation to perform the next 
step—not simply a manifestation of an intention that the steps should be 
combined. This requirement is necessary to prevent whipsawing of the 
IRS.491 The majority in McDonald’s asserted that, because the Commissioner 
would not grant an advanced ruling with regard to this transaction as a 
reorganization, the Commissioner should not be able to assert that that the 
transaction is a reorganization after the fact.492 The court acknowledged that 
the transfer of shares by the Garb-Stern group was pursuant to a “statutory 
merger under Delaware corporation law” and that the “Garb-Stern group was 
not obligated by contract to sell.”493 The intention never could be mutual 
because the Garb-Stern group always could change its intentions. For 
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example, if the McDonald’s stock price went up, the Garb-Stern group 
may have chosen to hold the stock rather than sell. Furthermore, the first 
expected registration, which did not take place, was in June—two months 
after the closing and plenty of time for price swings in McDonald’s shares, 
which could change whether the Garb-Stern group actually sold its 
stock.494 
III. BROADER THEMES AND OPEN QUESTIONS: BORROWING ACROSS 
AREAS OF LAW AND ALIGNING THEORY WITH PRACTICE 
This Article provides a view into two broader themes that can be 
explored fruitfully in future work. Both of these themes tie into promoting 
predictability and the rule of law by promoting consistent outcomes that 
can provide advance notice of the law to affected persons.495 The first 
theme is that tax law can benefit from drawing on doctrines in other areas 
of law when those areas of law are addressing the same types of 
transactions and subject matter as tax law. The second theme is that tax 
law and taxpayers benefit from the alignment of judicial doctrine and its 
application. 
Tax law often has been viewed as separate from other areas of law.496 
This is true both in the oft-stated idea that the federal income tax consequences 
of actions may be different than the state law consequences and in the 
creation of different doctrines both for statutory interpretation and for 
validity of regulations.497 Tax law is not as unique as it seems, however. 
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The subject matter of tax is the subject matter of other areas of law: the 
meaning of contractual terms; the effect of a corporate merger; and the 
rights of partners in relation to each other, among other things. These 
events have meaning in other areas of law as well as in tax law. Ownership 
rights confer not only the right to a stream of income but also the right to 
use property.498 This view of tax as exceptional limits the tools available 
to tax scholars, practitioners, and judges when faced with difficult 
interpretive questions.499 
 The second theme, the importance of aligning the articulation of 
judicial doctrines with their application, is demonstrated in the area of 
assertion of the application of judicial doctrines by the taxpayer.500 The 
traditional understanding has been that such application is highly 
limited.501 This understanding, however, is empirically questionable and 
in some cases has been limitedly abandoned by the IRS.502 These two facts 
should raise the question of whether the theory needs to be changed. There 
are also possibly other areas, including other judicial doctrines503 and 
general anti-abuse rules, where rules are applied differently than how they 
are articulated. Because judicial decisions and Treasury Regulations often 
state these rules in overly broad terms, the misalignment of the description 
of doctrine and its application render necessary a reexamination of the 
descriptive contours of these doctrines.504 This misalignment might even 
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be cured by looking to other areas of law for more precise definitions, as 
this Article advocates with respect to the definition of the step transaction 
doctrine tests. 
The alignment of judicial doctrine and its application is an important 
part of the rule of law. If courts articulate a test—whether characterized as 
a rule or a standard—but apply it differently than its articulation, then 
predictability is decreased and the rule of law is damaged accordingly.505 
Lawyers and clients should not have to study every case in an area to 
understand a thousand unstated exceptions to a test lacking any articulated 
exceptions. This misalignment of judicial doctrine and its application 
increases transaction costs and decreases predictability. It also harms the 
public image of justice.  
CONCLUSION 
Courts can achieve greater clarity by reconceptualizing the step 
transaction doctrine as consisting of two tests: an objective test for arms-
length transactions and an economic reality test for related-party transactions. 
These new tests would provide greater predictability for taxpayers—and the 
IRS—while still protecting the public treasury. By finding inspiration and 
guidance for the objective test in contract law, this Article also reinforces 
the argument that tax law is an inseparable part of law as a whole. By 
demonstrating that the objective test should be available to taxpayers in at 
least some circumstances, this Article demonstrates the benefit of aligning 
theory with practice. 
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